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Maryland Law Review
SUMMER 1949

VOLUME X

NUMBER 3

CONSTRUCTIVE DESERTION IN MARYLAND
By

HERBERT MYERBERG*

The aim of this article is to explore the development
in Maryland of the legal fiction of constructive desertion'
and to attempt to delineate the legitimate boundaries of
its application.
Certain elementary principles pertaining to the divorce
law of this State must be borne in mind from the outset.
In Maryland, jurisdiction of the court to grant divorce
is purely statutory, and in granting relief the court is con* Of the Baltimore City Bar, LL.B. 1931, University of Baltimore School
of Law. Lecturer (Practice Court), University of Baltimore School of
Law.
I The fictional character of the doctrine is obvious. In most cases where
it 'applies, the injured spouse is the one who initiates the actual physical
separation and the offending spouse is held to hayve "deserted". Thus by
employing the mystic adjective "constructive" the legal imagination spells
out the fiction whereby "that which has not the character assigned to it
in its own essential nature, acquires such character .. ." BLACK, LAW DIcTIONARY (2nd Ed. 1910) 255.
For all the harsh animadversion on the subject of legal fictions (see,
BENTHAM'S WORKS, Vol. 1, 243, Yol. 10, 75; JONES, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
TO THE THEORY OF LAW, 164, et seq.; Stearne, Fiction (1932), 81 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 1; Fuller, Legal Fictions (1930), 25 Ill. L. Rev. 363) ; and in spite
of the atmosphere of unreality which surrounds them, they have contributed
much to the growth and development of the law; and those which our
jurisprudence still retains embody a hard core of equity which has done
substantial justice in particular cases. (For example, consider the equitable
maxim-"Equity looks upon that as done which ought to be done", which
finds specific application in such doctrines as "Equitable Assignments",
"Equitable Conversion", "Resulting Trusts", "Constructi}ve Trusts", etc.).
Inherent in the application of legal fictions, however, is the ever present
danger of Judicial usurpation of the legislative function. The reality of
this danger finds illustration in the subject of this paper and is the
principal reason which prompted the writer to present it. As will be seen
from subsequent pages of the text, a misapplication of the doctrine of
constructve desertion can very easily result in the granting of a divorce
a vincillo rnatrimonii for cruelty, which the Legislature has declared to be
a ground only for a divorce a men8a et thoro. The inference to be drawn
from the language in a number of recent decisions of our Court of Appeals
where the doctrine was applied might lead some practitioners to the conclusion that the Court has finally responded to the ever-growing public
clamor for relaxation of the divorce laws. This, of course, the express
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fined to the causes specified in the statute.2 In one2 a section
of the statute the Legislature has set forth the causes entitling a party to an absolute (a vinculo) divorce. The
causes entitling a party to a partial (a mensa) divorce are
specified in a separate section.' Applications for partial
divorce and absolute divorce "proceed upon different sections of the statute, are founded upon a different state of
facts and aim at entirely different results".5 Thus a cause
which is exclusively a ground for an absolute divorce,
such as adultery, cannot be made the basis for a partial
divorce. In such a case, the party complaining may be
required to take more than he desires because the court
is without power to grant any other relief.6 On the other
hand, where the cause is an overlapping one, such as desertion,7 the court has authority to grant a partial divorce
even though the desertion was of the character and duralanguage of the decisions emphatically denies. In general statements of
policy the Court continues 'to adhere to the established Maryland rule that
a divorce will not be granted except for "grave and weighty causes" as
prescribed by the Legislature. Levering v. Levering, 16 Md. 213 (1860) ;
Gellar v. Gellar, 159 Md. 236, 150 A. 717 (1930) ; Miller v. Miller, 185 Md.
79, 42 A. 915 (1945) ; Kidwell v. Kidwell, 59 A. 2d 204 (Md. 1948). See the
opinion in Miller v. Miller, infra, 82, where Judge Delaplaine said: "In
more recent years, as the -attitude of the public has become more liberal
toward divorced persons, we have recognized in Maryland that the difficulty
and the responsibility of the duty cast upon equity courts to adjudge applications for divorce has increased, rather than diminished, because the law
of this State remains substantially the same as it was enacted in 1842,
while the people often overlook what the courts are bound to recognize, that
the State, representing society as a whole, has a real and vital interest in
avoiding dissolution of the marital relation except for grawve and weighty
causes." See also Crumlick v. Crumlick, 164 Md. 381, 384, 165 A. 189
(1933), where Judge Digges said: "There is a modern school of thought,
including in its members people of great refinement, unquestioned Integrity,
and the highest educational advantages, which contends that a policy different than the one adopted and adhered to In this State is the correct one,
more particularly as applied to married couples whose union has not
resulted in the production of offspring. If there should be and is to be a
change of policy on this subject, It is a legislative and not a judicial function. The Courts are 'bound only to pass divorce decrees when the evidence
produced establishes a legally recognized cause."
I Stewart v. Stewart, 105 Md. 297, 66 A. 16 (1907) ; Etheridge v. Etheridge,
120 Md. 11, 87 A. 497 (1913) ; Miller v. Miller, 153 Md. 213, 138 A. 22 (1927).
11Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 16, Sec. 40 as amended. Md. Laws (1949)
Ch. 520.
1 Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 16, ,Sec. 41A, a separate section providing for
Insanity as a ground for absolute divorce.
'Ibid., Sec. 41.
'Schwab v. Schwab, 93 Md. 382, 385, 49 A. 331 (1901).
'Stewart v. Stewart, supra,n. 2.
As pointed out In a note In Note, The Amending of Alinmny Cases in
Maryland (1948), 9 Md. L. Rev. 184, 189, desertion Is the "only overlapping
point of the grounds for partial and absolute divorce". (Italics supplied.)
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tion specified as a ground for an absolute divorce. But in
such case it is possible the injured spouse may be forever
precluded from obtaining an absolute divorce on the same
ground.' In cases where the party complaining seeks an
absolute divorce but the proof measures up only to a
cause which is specified as a ground for partial divorce,
the statute authorizes the court to decree a partial divorce.'
It is also provided by statute that the court shall have
jurisdiction to decree a divorce a vinculo matrimonii although the parties have previously been divorced a mensa
et thoro, and that a prior a mensa decree for abandonment
which was not of the character and duration required for
an absolute divorce shall not estop the party from subsequently obtaining an a vinculo decree for abandonment
proved to be of the requisite character and duration.9a The
practice has grown up under this provision of following
up an a mensa decree as a matter of course with an application for divorce a vinculo matrimonii, after the expiration
of the statutory period, with little or no attention being
given to the question of whether the a mensa decree was
based on abandonment or some other ground which is a
cause for partial divorce only.
The specific grounds for divorce with which we are
primarily concerned here are cruelty of treatment and
abandonment and desertion.' 0 As already indicated, deserDictum in Miller ,v. Miller, supra, n. 2. Cf. Kruse iv. Kruse, 183 Md. 369,
373, 37 A. 2d 898 (1944), where the Court said: "This is reading positive
language into the statute in lieu of the negattve language contained therein.
It is unnecessary for us, in this case, to either affirm or reverse the dictum
of the Miller case." See also the niai prius opinion of Dawkins, J. in
Miller V. Miller, Cir. Ct. of Baltimore City, filed Apr. 26, 1930, Daily Rec.,
Apr. 28, 1930, where the Chancellor granted an a vinculo divorce for abandonment although a prior a mensa decree had been granted on the same
testimony. Some weight was placed on the fact that the first decree was
the result of a mistake, but the Court added: "This Court Is satisfied that
the decree in the first case was the result of a mistake. The decision of
the case of Miller iv. Miller [153 Md. 213] was not meant to nullify the
effect of Article 16, Section 41 . . . which reads in part as follows: 'When
a bill prays for a divorce a vinculo rnatrimonii, the fact that the parties
have been divorced a men8a et thoro shall not be taken to interfere with
the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject ..
9
Supra, n. 4.
9a Md. Code (1939) Art. 18, Sec. 44.
10The terms "abandonment" and "desertion" will be used interchangeably
in this Article as they are substantial equivalents and embody substantially
the same elements. 1 BisHoP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, sec. 1665;
Muller fv. Muller, 125 Md. 72, 93 A. 404 (1915).
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tion as a matrimonial offense, is a ground for both a partial
and an absolute divorce, depending upon the character and
duration of the offense. Cruelty, however, is a ground for
a partial divorce only. The statute provides:
"Divorces a 'mensa et thoro may be decreed for the
following causes, to wit:
"First, cruelty of treatment; ... Thirdly, abandonment and desertion .... It
"...
the Court may decree a divorce a vinculo
matrimonii for the following causes, to wit: .
fourthly, when . . . the party complained against has
abandoned the party complaining, and that such abandonment has continued uninterruptedly for at least
eighteen months, and is deliberate and final, and the
separation of the parties is beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation; .
Abandonment and desertion as a ground for either a
partial or absolute divorce, must embody two distinct elements: first, the ending of cohabitation, and second, an
intent on the part of the offending spouse to desert. It must
be the deliberate act of the party complained of, done with
the intent that the marriage relation should no longer
exist. Although separation and intent must concur, the
two elements need not begin together. Desertion becomes
complete whenever to either one the other is added."8
Cruelty, as a ground for divorce, has been defined by
the Court of Appeals on innumerable occasions. The formula for legal cruelty is thus stated by Judge Henderson
in Sensabaugh v. Sensabaugh:"* * * a single act of violence
will not justify a divorce on the grounds of cruelty nor do
sallies of passion, harshness, rudeness, and use of profane
language. Only danger to life, limb or health will constitute
such cruelty." 4 Sometimes the formula is otherwise stated
to require such a "course of conduct which would make
cohabitation inconsistent with the self respect of the inSupra, n. 4.
Supra, n. 3.
"Etheridge v. Etheridge, 8upra, n. 2; Dunnigan v. Dunnigan, 182 Md. 47,
31 A. 2d 634 (1943).
u 186 Md. 348, 351, 46 A. 2d 635 (1945). It is in reality a description rather
than a formula or definition.
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jured party or a serious menace to his or her physical or
mental health".' 5
The fiction of constructive desertion is basically a simple
and reasonable concept which does relatively little violence
to actual fact. It finds justification, perhaps, in the common
sense view that there is, in substance, no difference between
the conduct of the man who leaves his wife and that of
a man who forces his wife to leave him. Let us consider
a few simple examples, without regard to intent and other
technical requirements. If W leaves the matrimonial domicile she is guilty of actual desertion. If W leaves the matrimonial domicile because H beats her and she is in fear
of her life and limb, H is guilty of constructive desertion.
Although in the case supposed, H has not left the matrimonial domicile and the actual separation was initiated
by W, H's conduct impelled W to leave and in contemplation of law H has deserted. A physical departure from the
matrimonial domicile is not required to make the doctrine
operative. Thus where H without cause refuses to have
marital relations with W, he is guilty of constructive desertion although the parties continue to reside under the same
roof. It may be wondered why such a simple and seemingly innocuous doctrine should arrest our attention in a
special study. When we consider, however, its potentiality
as an instrument for judicially legislating absolute divorces
on the ground of cruelty, the effort seems justified. In
1870, the Court of Appeals in Lynch v. Lynch' 6 admonished
that, in the absence of proof that the offending spouse by
his or her conduct intended a final separation and termination of the marriage relation, "Cruelty of treatment,
which is only ground for a qualified divorce, must not be
allowed, when used as a justification for living separate
from the offending party, to be made the ground for a final
21 Offutt, J., in Abrahams v. Abrahams, Circ. Ct. for Baltimore
County,
Daily Record, January 6, 1937. See also Cullota v. Cullota, 66 A. 2d 919
(Md. 1049).
1633 Md. 328 (1870). And see Hoffman v. Hoffman, I B. C. R. 327 (1893),
where Judge Wickes, sitting in the Cir. Ct. No. 2 of Baltimore City, said:
"Not one of these acts [of cruelty] on his part Is cause for anything but
a qualified divorce, but taken together, after a lapse of the statutory period,
they are practically made, what the law never intended, a ground for the
final and absolute divorcement of the parties.".
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decree." Intent is the crux of the matter. Thus if H beats
and mistreats W on several occasions, but invariably repents and offers reconciliation, he is guilty of cruelty and
W has the right to leave; but there is no intent to bring
about a termination of the marriage relation, and there
can be no constructive desertion. In such a case, W's only
remedy is a partial divorce for cruelty. The flux of time
cannot change the situation. A final divorce would not be
justified whether W waited eighteen months from the last
act of cruelty before filing the bill or immediately procured a partial divorce and after the expiration of eighteen
months filed for an absolute divorce in accordance with
the usual practice. If, as appears to be the present tendency
of the Court of Appeals, the case is treated as one of constructive desertion merely because H is guilty of cruelty,
without any effort to search for and find the requisite
intent to terminate the marriage relation, evasion of the
17
divorce statute is apparent. A number of recent decisions
not only seem to make too easy a transition from "cruelty"
to "constructive desertion" but also have fallen into the
habit of quoting the misleading headnote to Harding v.
Harding' to the effect that the offending spouse can be
guilty of constructive desertion although his conduct did
not amount to legal cruelty, which is a proposition wholly
without foundation in the law of this State.
The only categories of marital misconduct to which
the doctrine of constructive desertion properly applies
are as follows:
1. Legal cruelty accompanied by the requisite intent
to terminate the marriage relation.
2. Cessation of marital intercourse without just cause.
3. Refusal of a bona fide offer of reconciliation.
4. Unjustified refusal to maintain a home separate and
apart from parents or other relatives.
7 Kruse v. Kruse, 179 Md. 657, 22 A. 2d 475 (1941) ; Miller rv. Miller,
infra, n. 82; Nicodemus iv. Nicodemus, 186 Md. 659, 48 A. 2d 442 (1946) ;
Robertson v. Robertson, 187 Md. 560, 51 A. 2d 73 (1947) ; Geisey (V.Geisey,
59 A. 2d 319 (Md. 1948) ; Smith iv. Smith, 63 A. 2d 628 (Md. 1949) ; Eberwein v. Eberwein, 65 A. 2d 792 (Md. 1949). CI. contra, Collins v. Collins,
184 Md. 655, 42 A. 2d 680 (1945). For discussion of these cases, see text,
Poat.
022 Md. 337 (1864) as reported in Perkins Anno. Ed. See text; poet,
for discussion of this error.
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1. Legal cruelty accompanied by the requisite intent
to terminate the marriage relation
It was not until approximately twenty years after the
enactment of the first divorce statute in Maryland that the
Court of Appeals was called on to consider the doctrine
of constructive desertion. In 1860, the Court had before
it the case of Levering v. Levering,9 wherein the wife filed
a bill for an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion
of more than three years' duration. The evidence showed
that the husband had inflicted physical violence upon his
wife and had otherwise ill-treated her. The wife left and
took up residence with her father. Following the separation
the husband earnestly sought without success to effect a
reconciliation. The Court refused to grant an absolute
divorce for desertion because it was unable to find in the
husband's conduct the essential element of intent to bring
about a final termination of the marriage relation. The
Court recognized the propriety of applying the doctrine of
constructive desertion in a proper case, but it could not do
so in the instant case because the husband's efforts to
become reconciled clearly negatived the fatal intent.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the husband's acts
of cruelty remained as a distinct matrimonial offense for
which the Court could, and did, grant the wife a partial
divorce. The Court did not consider whether the wife
might have been guilty of desertion by reason of her refusal
to accept her repentant husband's offers of reconciliation.
Although this question of the obligation to accept an offer
of reconciliation where the offending spouse has been guilty
of cruelty will be referred to later, it is proper to interpose
here that the law of this State appears to impose a more
stringent burden upon the offending spouse in such cases
than in the common variety of desertion cases free of
cruelty or other complications, where a mere showing of
the bona fides of an unqualified offer will compel acceptance.2" Aside from the problem posed, the Levering deci19 Supra, n. 1.
20See Wise v. Wise, 159 Md. 596, 152 A. 230 (1930) ; Zuckerberg v. Zuckerberg, 53 A. 2d 20 (Md. 1947) ; Slf 4vinsky v. Slayinsky, 287 Mass. 28, 190 N. E.

826 (1934) ; and text at n. 123a and n. 123b, post.
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sion conclusively establishes the principle that in a cruelty
case a bona fide offer of reconciliation dissipates the element of intent to terminate the marriage relation and
eliminates the factual basis upon which the fiction of
constructive desertion depends. It is interesting to examine
the reasoning of the Court in arriving at this sound conclusion. Judge Bartol said:
"Here the complainant was not abandoned by the
defendant; she left his home and society . . . The
argument of the appellee is, that the appellant's failure
to support her, his intemperate habits and violence
committed upon her person, justified her in leaving
him, and was, in law, an abandonment of her by him.
We can very well imagine a case in which this argument would apply. If a man fails to supply his wife
with such necessaries and comforts of life as are within
his reach, and by cruelty compels her to quit him, and
seek shelter and protection elsewhere, we should have
no hesitancy in saying it would be as much an abandonment of her by him, as if he had deserted her and gone
away himself." In this case, the evidence does not sustain the charge that Levering failed, or was unwilling,
to support his wife, or share with her the fruits of his
scanty and meager earnings.2 2 There is evidence to
prove that, on one occasion, forgetful of his duty and
obligation to cherish and protect her, or, what is more
probable, impelled by the madness of intoxication, he
inflicted violence upon her person. Such conduct, when
"This last sentence might be considered a contradiction of the ultimate
decision in that it implies that Intent to terminate the marriage relation is
not essential where the husband drives the wife away by his cruelty. Yet
the Court goes on to hold that Levering was guilty of legal cruelty which
justified his wife in leaving but that he was not guilty of desertion because
of the absence of the requisite intent. Thirty-three years after this
decision, a ni8i prius court criticized this sentence in the following language:
"This doctrine ... has furnished the pretext for a great many improvident
divorces in this State. . . . It is not to be wondered at that the same
Court in a subsequent case introduced a new element into the rule to
which we have just referred." (Wickes, J., in Hoffman iv. Hoffman, supra,
n. 16). The subsequent case referred to was Lynch iv. Lynch, supra, n. 16,
discussed, po8t, in the text. The "new element" referred to was that mere
cruelty will not support an action based on constructive desertion unless
coupled with the intent to terminate the marriage. The Lynch case did not
introduce this "element" as something new. Whether recognized or not,
it was implicit in the decision In the Levering case, although the Court's
opinion in that case did not once use the word "intent".
2Failure
to support, except in so far as it was a circumstance reflecting
upon the husband's intent, -would seem to be immaterial, as mere failure
to support is not desertion. Brunner tv. Brunner, 70 Md. 105 (1889)
Sausexv. Sause, 63 A. 2d 632, (Md. 1949).
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taken in connection with other facts and circumstances
of the case, showing his ill-treatment of his wife, in
the eye of humanity and the law, would justify her in
leaving his society; but it does not warrant a Court to
pronounce a decree of final separation between them.
The statute requires that the abandonment shall continue uninterruptedly for at least three years. The
proof in this case is, that the appellant has earnestly
and anxiously sought to have his wife restored to him,
and to renew their marital relations. In such a case, we
think it would be a perversion of the meaning of the
law, to declare that there exists cause for a divorce
a vinculo matrimonii. It does not come within either
the letter or the spirit of the Acts of Assembly.
"By the Act of 1841, the Court is authorized to decree a divorce a mensa et thoro for cruelty of treatment. We have said that in this case there is evidence
of such cruelty as justified the complainant in leaving
the society of her husband. Such evidence, under the
law, authorizes us to sanction that separation by pronouncing a decree a mensa et thoro, and this relief we
are warranted in granting by the evidence in this

cause...

"22a

Four years later, in 1864, the Court was presented with
the converse of the situation in the Levering case. In
2 3 the wife filed her bill for a partial
Harding v. Harding,
divorce based on cruelty and desertion. The evidence disclosed that shortly after the marriage, while the wife was
confined to bed following child-birth, the husband impeached her chastity prior to marriage, denied the paternity
of the child and repeatedly told her that he would not
permit her to remain in the house and that she must leave
as soon as her confinement was over. The husband admitted
in his answer that he would have removed his wife from the
home by force if she had not left. The Court held that
although the husband's conduct did not amount to legal
cruelty, 24 he was guilty of desertion in the technical sense
Levering v. Levering, 8upra, n. 1, 218.
S0upra, n. 18.
"The trend of recent decisions would seem to brand Harding's reflection
upon his wife's chastity as legal cruelty. See Silverberg v. Silverberg, 148
Md. 682, 130 A. 325 (1925). Poole v. Poole, 176 Md. 696, reported in 6 A.
2d 243 (1939), noted in Note, Is Mental Cruelty a Ground for Partial
Divorce? (1940), 5 Md. L. Rev. 111. Cf. Stevens T. Stevens, 183 Md. 590,
12
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just as if he had forcibly evicted his wife. The decision
.was clearly based on a finding of "actual desertion" as
opposed to "constructive desertion". The husband's conduct was the exact equivalent of a forcible ejection from the
home. In addition, the husband's intent to terminate the
marriage relationship was apparent. Judge Bartol again
spoke for the Court and said:
"But the evidence establishes the fact that the appellant was compelled to leave the house of the appellee
and seek a home with her parents. It is true that she
was not ejected from his dwelling by personal violence.
... in his answer he admits that he would have removed her from his house if she had not gone. The
testimony further shows that after she had left, he
stated repeatedly that she should not return * * *
Under these circumstances, he told her to leave his
house; her expulsion was as much compulsory as if
he had employed force to eject her. And being, according to the proof in the record, without sufficient
cause, we must consider it as an unjustifiable abandonment and desertion on his part. ''So it was decided in
Levering v. Levering, 16 Md. 213. 25
In 1870, the Court of Appeals clearly and unequivocally
rejected an attempt to convert cruelty into desertion so
as to authorize an absolute divorce after the flux of the
statutory period, there being a total absence of the requisite
intent to terminate the marriage relation. In Lynch v.
Lynch,2 6 the husband was forced to leave the wife because
of her cruelty. The separation having continued for over
three years, the husband sued for an absolute divorce. The
Court refused this relief but awarded a partial divorce on
the specific ground of cruelty. Judge Alvey, speaking for
the Court, said:
39 A. 2d 690 (1944) where the wife's charge of adultery agaixist her husband
was not made publicly and the Court rejected it as a basis for a finding
of cruelty on the part of the wife. It should be noted that in the Harding
case there was no specific evidence to indicate that the charge of unchastity
was made publicly prior to the filing of the answer by the husband.
"This last sentence was olviously an Inadvertence on the part of Judge
Bartol because in the Levering case, as we halve already seen, he held there
was no desertion but cruelty only. His reference was probably to the
dictum referred to at n. 21. supra.
"Supra, n, 16.
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"The proof shows a lamentable state of domestic
discord to have existed, and unbearable persecution
of the husband by the wife ...but there is no sufficient
proof to establish the fact ...that the wife... ever deliberately designed, by her conduct, to effect a final separation of herself and husband, beyond reconciliation,
however naturally that conduct may have tended to
alienate the husband from his home, and finally determined him to desert it. The evidence shows that the
unhappy relations between the parties, was mainly
owing to the wife's ungovernable and vicious temper,
and a morbid jealousy of her husband; but so far from
having a deliberate design of producing an abandonment, it appears that, after her paroxysms of passion
had subsided, she was always ready to admit her fault,
and willing to become reconciled, promising not to
repeat her offensive conduct. The desertion of the
common home was the act of the husband, the party
complaining, and although he may have been fully
justified in so doing, still he is not in a position to be
divorced, on the ground of abandonment by the wife.
Cruelty of treatment, which is only ground for a qualified divorce, must not be allowed, when used as a
justification for living separate from the offending
party, to be made the ground for a final divorce.6 a
Abandonment to constitute ground for a final divorce,
must be the deliberate act of the party complained
of, done with the intent that the marriage relation
should no longer exist. And with this there is nothing
decided in the case of Levering v. Levering, 16 Md.
213, at all in conflict, as seems to be supposed by the
counsel for the appellant; nor does the case of Harding
v. Harding, 22 Md. 337, tend to support a different
principle....
"But, although a divorce a vinculo matrimonii cannot be granted, the facts of the case show ample cause
for a divorce a mensa et thoro. According to the most
restricted definition of cruelty of treatment, as ground
to decree separation, this case falls within it. The
wife's conduct towards the husband is shown to be
violent and outrageous, and such as to render impossible 2the proper discharge of the duties of married
life."

1b

" Italics supplied.
6b Supra, n.

1, 329.
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In spite of this clear analysis of the elixir without which
there can be no transmutation of "cruelty" into "desertion",
parties seeking a permanent dissolution of the marriage
ties continued to try their hand at this alchemy although
they could not distill from the ingredients of their marital
strife the essential elixir of intent. In 1893, a nisi prius
court in a strongly worded opinion cautioned litigants
against such experiments. Judge Wickes, sitting in the
Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, said in Hoffman v.
Hoffman:
"The question we have to deal with in the case in
hand is whether a wife who leaves her husband because
of his cruelty, intemperance and non-support, and remains away from him for three years is entitled to a
divorce ex vinculo on the ground that his conduct was
in law, an abandonment of her by him.
"In Levering v. Levering, 16 Md. 218, a case always
relied upon by those who seek to make of cruel treatment a ground of divorce a vinculo by simply waiting
three years after the separation commences and then
converting it into a case of abandonment, the facts
were very similar to those in this case."2 7
Quoting from the Levering case, Judge Wickes continued:
"'If a man fails to supply his wife with such necessaries and comforts of life as are within his reach, and
by cruelty compels her to quit him and seek shelter
and protection elsewhere, we would have no hesitation
in saying it would be as much an abandonment of her
by him as if he had deserted her and gone away.' This
dictum of the judge who delivered the opinion has
furnished the pretext for a great many improvident
divorces in this State. Standing alone, it simply means,
that if a husband is intemperate, fails to support his
wife and is guilty of cruelty toward her, she may leave
his house, wait until three years have expired and then
procure an absolute divorce, and that too, whether the
evidence discloses any purpose on his part that the
marriage relation shall cease or not. And yet not one
of these acts on his part is cause for anything but a
qualified divorce, but taken together, after a lapse of
2Supra,n. 16, 327.
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the statutory period, they are practically made, what
the law never intended, a ground for the final and
absolute divorcement of the parties.
"It is not to be wondered at that the same Court
in a subsequent case introduced a new element28 into
the rule to which we have just referred."
Judge Wickes then quoted from the Lynch case for the
proposition that to constitute abandonment there must be
an intent to terminate the marriage relation and concluded
as follows:
"To say that this intent can be inferred from the
acts of intemperance or cruelty, or both, is simply to
pervert the law, which provides a suitable remedy for
such a grievance. There must be some affirmative proof
that the motive lying at the foundation of such conduct
is the dissolution of the marriage tie, something that
would satisfy the Court that there was a deliberate
purpose on the part of the person complained of, that
the marriage relation should cease. ...
"The evidence discloses what the bill alleges that
the defendant is worthless, intemperate and has threatened to do violence to his wife's person. Under such
circumstances she left him as she was fully justified
in doing.
"But there is not a scintilla of proof that his purpose
was to destroy the relation he bore to his wife, unless
it be inferred from the facts complained of, which cannot be done."2 s
Judge Wickes therefore held that the complainant was entitled to nothing more than a partial divorce for cruelty.
Judge Wickes' opinion was an accurate restatement of
the law of Maryland as announced in the Lynch case except
so far as he concluded that the requisite intent to desert
could not under any circumstances be inferred as a natural
consequence of the offending party's cruelty. This conclusion may have been drawn from the following language
in the Lynch case:"9
Ibid., 327. See also 8upra,n. 21.
- Ibid., 328.
S1upra, n. 16, 329.
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". .. there is no sufficient proof to establish the
fact ... that the wife ... ever deliberately designed
by her conduct, to effect a final separation of herself
and husband, beyond reconciliation, however naturally
that conduct may have tended to alienate the husband
from
his home, and finally determined him to desert
it.")29a
It must be remembered, however, that in the Lynch case
the offending wife "was always ready to admit her fault,
and willing to become reconciled, promising not to repeat
her offensive conduct"-thereby rebutting any inference
of intent to terminate the marriage which might otherwise have been inferred from her misconduct.
The true rule, supported by the weight of authority
in this country, is that intent to terminate the marriage
relation may be inferred, prima facie, as the natural consequence of the offending spouse's misconduct." As pointed
out by Mr. Bishop,"' the requisite intent "must be an
actual purpose of the mind, not a mere fiction of the law.
Yet in matter of evidence, one is presumed to intend the
natural and probable consequences of his acts." The English
rule in constructive desertion cases is the same. 2 This
rule, however, is merely procedural, and where the offending spouse adduces affirmative evidence to the effect that
he did not intend a dissolution of the relationship and
sought reconciliation "the prima facie desertion is re2a Italics supplied.
801

BISHOP,

MARRIAGE,

DIVORCE AND

SEPARATION,

secs. 1721,

1723,

1727,

1730; KsERZ,
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, sec. 334; 9 R.C.L. 362, sec. 1498;
17 Am. Jur. 202, sec. 101. See also dicta in Ritz v. Ritz, 52 A. 2d 729
(Md. 1947), quoted at n. 36, post.
"Ibid., Sec. 1723.
"See 92 Sol. J. 147 (1948), where the writer says: "In essence it is clear
now that the law has once again come to rest on the bedrock of the reasonable man-or rather reasonable spouse-that excellent person upon whose
continued existence so much of the law of England depends. . . We are
back to the reasonable spouse, for what the natural consequences of any
particular conduct are must depend on how a reasonable spouse might be
expected to act in the face of that conduct. Once again the reasonable man
provides the conivenient means for the law to keep pace with public opinion,
for the reasonable spouse Is subject to the same evolutionary process as
are other humans, and the rough treatment which was the lot of Elizabeth
Paston and other wtves of her time, and which nevertheless nerver caused
her to leave the matrimonial home, might now cause the 20th century
reasonable wife to leave her husband-at -the double."
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butted"."3 As stated above, this was precisely the situation
in the Lynch case, although the rationale of the Court's conclusion was not discussed. The original papers in the Hoffman case 4 disclose that it was an uncontested proceeding which went to the Court on the report of the
Master. The wife's testimony, which was fully corroborated, was to the effect that she had left the home because
her husband's cruel conduct put her in fear of her life
and that "ever since we have been separated he has refused to do anything for me or our baby, and in no way
has he ever tried to have me live with him or done anything for me. There can never be any reconciliation between us now." This testimony was clearly sufficient to
raise a prima facie case of desertion based upon the natural
consequences which flowed from the acts complained of.
There being no testimony offered by the husband, who had
allowed a decree pro confesso to be entered against him,
the wife had made out a case of constructive desertion entitling her to an absolute divorce. It would appear, therefore, that Judge Wickes' ultimate decision in this particular case was incorrect.85
It is strange that in spite of the ever increasing reliance
upon constructive desertion as a basis for divorce the Court
of Appeals has never found it necessary to pass upon or
even to discuss (except by way of the most casual dictum)8 6
81BIsHOP, supra, n. 30, sec. 1727, 1731. See also Crumlick T. Crumlick,
supra, n. 1 and Schwartz v. Schwartz, 158 Md. 80, 148 A. 259 (1929).
Cir. Ct. No. 2 of Baltimore City, Dkt. 2, #A 1584.
It is one of the paradoxes involved in the exercise of judicial discretion
and the phrasing employed in judicial opinions that a sound statement of
the law Is sometimes followed by an Incorrect conclusion whereas an
unsound statement of the law is sometimes followed by a correct conclusion.
See for example Maguire iv. State, 65 A. 2d 299 (Md. 1949), invo 1ving a
problem in statutory construction, where the Court of Appeals agreed with
the lower court's statement of the law but not with its application.
1 The Court said, without citation of authority, in Ritz v. Ritz, 8upra,
n. 30, 732: "If the cruelty of the wife is so extreme that it drives her
husband away from her, the law presumes that she Intended such effect of
her cruelty." This was clearly dictum as the Court found in the wife's
conduct no justification for the husband's departure since his life and
health "were not sufficiently endangered" by the wife's conduct.
It is possible that the recent Maryland decisions take the "natural consequences" theory for granted and assume the existence of the requisite Intent
In cases where legal cruelty Is established. If such is the case, then the
Court, in its silent application of the theory, has failed to give effect to
that portion of the procedural rule which holds the presumption of intent
to desert rebutted by a proper offer of reconciliation. This is amply illustrated by the Kruse case, discussed in the text, post.
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the procedural rule of prima facie desertion based upon the
"natural consequences" theory. 7 The recent decisions involving cruelty as constructive desertion are content to
restrict the inquiry to the simple question of whether the
injured spouse was justified in leaving the matrimonial
domicile. Having once concluded this in the affirmative,
the transmutation to constructive desertion is complete
without any attempt to find the requisite intent through
the procedural method of the "natural consequences" theory
or otherwise. The point is simply ignored.8" This is a
fundamental departure from the Lynch case and has led
practitioners, frequently to the detriment of their clients,
to concede that a charge of desertion is made out in every
case where legal cruelty is established.
Every case of constructive desertion based on cruelty
presents a challenge to the legislative will which has declared cruelty to be cause for a partial divorce only.89 Our
I The nearest approach to the problem appears to have been in Schwartz
v. Schwartz, supra n. 33, a case in-volving actual desertion, wherein the
defendant-husband contended that his departure was not with intent to
desert but was based on a desire to establish a home apart from the wife's
children by a former marriage. Referring to the wife's testimony that her
husband left without excuse or explanation and afterwards asked her for
a separation and to the testimony of a corroborating witness who also
testified that the husband had declared after the separation that he never
intended to live with his wife, Judge Offutt said: "While that evidence is
not entirely satisfactory, it is at least sufficient to raise a prima facie presumption that in leaving her home Schwartz intended to desert his wife,
and to cast upon him the burden of showing that ie had no such intent.
Schwartz himself did not in so many words deny that he had deserted his
wife, or that when he left her he did not intend to finally separate from
her, but he attempted to show that he had repeatedly invited her to live
with him in his home. Such conduct, if proved, was sufficient to negative
the presumption that in leaving her home he had intended to desert the
appellee."
88See cases cited supra, n. 17.
And analysis at n. 54, infra, Nicodemus v.
Nicodemus, 8upra, n. 17, 666: "The conduct of the husband was such, in
our opinion, as to justify the wife in leajving him . . . We therefore hold
the husband guilty of constructive abandonment." Smith v. Smith, supra,
n. 19, 631: "We believe there was ample evidence . . . that the husband's
cinduct justified the wife in leaving him, and therefore that his conduct
amounted to constructive desertion." Maranto v. Maranto, 64 A. 2d 144
(Md. 1944): "It [defendant's conduct] justified plaintiff in terminating
marital relations and constitutes constructive desertion on defendant's
part."
8
11n Pidge v. Pidge, 3 Met. 257 (1841), the Massachusetts Court met the
challenge by a virtual rejection of the doctrine of constructive desertion.
-The statute there under consideration-somewhat like the Maryland statute
-made desertion a ground for both a partial and an absolute divorce but
cruelty. was specified as a ground for a partial divorce only. The wife in
this case sought an absolute divorce, basing her claim to relief on a
constructive desertion resulting from the husband's .cruel and abusive con-
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Legislature has not seen fit to attach the penalty of an
absolute divorce to such marital misconduct. The Court,
as the guardian and expositor of the Legislature's mandate,
cannot prevent its subversion unless there is ever present
in the judicial mind the necessity for finding the requisite
intent to desert and a consciousness of the evidentiary or
procedural techniques which aid in the search. The two
cases which arose out of the marital strife of Mr. and Mrs.
Kruse" illustrate perfectly the dangers inherent in the
doctrine of constructive desertion and the ease with which
the Court can unwittingly legislate an absolute divorce for
cruelty, although there was clearly no intent to desert on
the part of the offending wife, who was ever anxious for
a reconciliation. In the first Kruse case, the husband sought
an absolute divorce based on constructive desertion due to
the wife's cruelty, the separation having endured for the
statutory period at the time of the filing of the husband's
cross-bill claiming affirmative relief. The Chancellor refused an absolute divorce but granted the husband a parduct which compelled her to leave him. In refusing this relief the Court
said: "Had it been the purpose of the legislature to authorize a divorce
from the bond of matrimony for extreme cruelty, or gross neglect to provide suitable maintenance for the wife, we must suppose that these cases
would have been specified in the statute of 1838; and the fact that they are
not so specified seems conclusive on the point of the intention of 'the legislature . . . To hold otherwise would be adding to the provisions of this
statute and opening the door for the greatest latitude in granting divorces.
• . . The legislature has annexed no such penalty, as a divorce from the
bond of matrimony for causes like those just enumerated. Yet such would
be the practical construction of the statute, if it be admitted, that In
cases where the wife leaves her husband fer Justifiable cause arising out
of his misconduct, such separation is legally and technically a desertion
by the husband." This decision appears entirely too narrow in its failure
to recognize the "natural consequences" theory. Mr. Bishop criticizes the
case, saying: "The Court seems not to have had its attention directed to
the question whether in matter of evidence, the husband should be presumed to have intended the separation which his ill-conduct made necessary for the safety of the wife. In this view, evidently the result arrived
at 'by the majority of the court is a departure from correct principle." 1
BisHop, MARRIAGE, DivoRCE AND SEPARATION, Sec. 1730. At See. 1729, n. 3,
Mr. Bishop, in referring to the Pidge case, somewhat inaccurately, says:
"Something like this was likewise held In a Maryland case. Lynch rv. Lynch,
33 Md. 328." While it is true that the ultimate decision in the Lynch case
was the same as in Pidge v. Pidge, 8upra, there was no "departure from
correct principle" since the prima facte presumption of desertion had been
rebutted by the repeated efforts at reconciliation. Although there was no
discussion by the Court of the procedural aspects of the "natural consequences" theory, the Lynch case arrived at a correct result upon correct
principle.
10Kruse v. Kruse, supra,n. 17, first case; 183 Md. 369; 87 A. 2d 898 (1944),
second case.
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tial divorce on the express authority of the Lynch case.
The clear implication of the Chancellor's opinion was that
an absolute divorce could not be granted because desertion
was not proved due to the wife's efforts to become reconciled but that the wife's cruelty remained as a separate
ground to support an a mensa decree. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decree on the theory that the wife was guilty
of constructive desertion. Approximately two years later
the husband filed a bill for an absolute divorce based on
his wife's continued desertion and the Court of Appeals
held him entitled to the relief prayed. As will be shown
in the subsequent analysis of the Kruse case, the Court completely ignored the question of intent, and in addition lent
color to the unfounded proposition that a case of constructive desertion can be made out by a showing of ill-conduct
short of legal cruelty.
Until the first Kruse case in 1941, the decisions of the
Court of Appeals dealing with cruelty as constructive desertion appear to have been kept within the proper confines
of the doctrine. Thus in Taylor v. Taylor,4 constructive
abandonment was held not to have been established where
the husband's conduct did not mount up to legal cruelty,
and he had repeatedly requested his wife to return to him.
42
we find a repetition of the factual
In Pattison v. Pattison
situation involved in the Hardingcase, the husband charging the wife with adultery, denying the paternity of two
of her children and ordering her out of the house. As in
the Harding case, the Court does not ground its decision
upon constructive desertion but virtually finds an actual
desertion coupled with the requisite intent. The Court said:
"Where a wife is forced to leave her husband under
such circumstances, with the evident purpose to put
an end to the marriage relation, he must be held to
have abandoned and deserted her. This case is so
strikingly like the case of Harding v. Harding, 22 Md.
337, it is not necessary to cite other authorities . . .
Forcing her to leave his home under the circumstances
stated and then placing upon record a formal charge
"108 Md: 129, 69 A. 632 (1908).
"132 Md. 362, 103 A. 977 (1918).
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of adultery against her, shows that the abandonment
of the appellant in this case was 'the deliberate act'
of the husband, 'done with the intent that the marriage
relation should no longer exist . . . and entitled
the
4' 2
appellee to the relief sought in her cross-bill'.' a
In Wald v. Wald", Schilling v. Schilling,4" and Bonwit v.
Bonwit, 4a the Court denied relief for alleged constructive
desertion because legal cruelty had not been shown. Judge
Parker in the Wald case so far recognized the principle
inherent in the Lynch case that he felt compelled to say
that:
"even if the version of the husband were held to be
established, the behavior of the wife could not be considered a constructive abandonment and desertion by
the wife, who was ever anxious for a reconciliation."4 5
In Silverberg v. Silverberg46 the Court recognized as
legal cruelty, in its most intolerable form, public accusations of infidelity.47 In this case the charge was coupled
with other acts and conduct over a period of years which
indicated a studied effort on the part of the husband to
humiliate and degrade his wife and drive her away by
every type of aggravating conduct short of physical violence. The husband's intent to terminate the marital relation was manifest. As pointed out by the Court:
"The quality of premeditation and deliberation in
these studied insults was reflected in their repetition
in the husband's testimony. . . . The husband's continued misconduct naturally caused the marital relation to become intolerable, and no particular importance is attached to the fact that the husband did not
Ibid., 368.
"161 Md. 493, 159 A. 97 (1932).
"167 Md. 151, 173 A. 10 (1934).
'" 169 Md. 189, 181 A. 237 (1935). In this case the Court said. 193:
Unless the wife has met the burden undertaken by her of establishing ...
that the husband is guilty of legal cruelty, by which is meant such conduct
on his part as will endanger her life, her person, or health, or will cause
reasonable apprehension of bodily suffering, then she is not justified in law
in refusing to continue the marital relation and there would be no desertion
on the part of the husband." (Italics supplied.)
Supra, n. 43, 497.
"1Supra, n. 24.
"?For a similar case see Poole !v. Poole, supra, n. 24. Of., Stevens iv.
Stevens, supra, n. 24, where the rule of the Silverberg case was not applied
in favor of the husband. it appearing that the wife's accusations were not
made publicly.
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drive the wife from his home by force. If artifice and
craft succeed, they are quite as reprehensible, while
not so obvious and crude, as open compulsion. And the
actor in either case is responsible for the contemplated
result. The Court is satisfied that the husband contrived the departure of the wife and accept it with
complacency. 4 7"
Returning now to an analysis of the Kruse4 cases, we
find that the original proceedings were commenced by a
bill for partial divorce filed by Mrs. Kruse on February 5,
1937, alleging separation of the parties on February 29,
1936. On February 6, 1939, Mrs. Kruse amended her bill
to one for alimony only, and on January 12, 1940, Mr.
Kruse filed a cross-bill for an absolute divorce based on
his wife's alleged constructive desertion on February 29,
1936, which was more than three years prior to the filing
of the cross-bill. The evidence showed that Mrs. Kruse
was a high-strung, emotional woman whose conduct at
times bordered on insanity. She had an ungovernable temper and frequently created unnecessary disturbances and
embarrassment to Mr. Kruse by going to his place of business and charging him with familiarity with certain female
employees. Since the final separation, Mrs. Kruse earnestly
sought reconciliation with her husband; but he rejected
her advances, declaring that he would rather be dead than
live with his wife. The facts in this case were almost an
exact counterpart of the Lynch case. Indeed this was recognized by Chief Judge Bond, who wrote the opinion in the
first case, when he said: "The case here seems to the Court,
finally, to be in a class with that of Lynch v. Lynch, supra,
in which the reasons for the separation were the wife's
'ungovernable . . .temper and . . .morbid jealousy', less
than insanity."4 a The Chancellor who decided the case
below49 relied solely upon the Lynch case in denying
relief to the wife, rejecting the husband's prayer for an
absolute divorce and granting him an a mensa decree for
"I
8 Supra, n. 16, 691.

, Supra,n. 40.
Supra,n. 16, 664.
S
Ulman, J. His opinion, which was ivery short, appears only at p. 3
of Appellee's brief on the first appeal, 179 Md. 657. See reference at p. 26
of Record on second appeal, 183 Md. 369.
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cruelty only.5" This is precisely what was done in the
Lynch case. Nevertheless, Chief Judge Bond went off on
the theory that the wife was guilty of constructive desertion, and, in affirming the decree below, said:
"It is settled that conduct of one spouse which compels the other to leave may justify a divorce to that
other on the ground of desertion, even though the conduct may not justify a divorce on the ground of
crueltyaa Harding v. Harding, supra; Singewald v.
Singewald, 165 Md. 136. It must, however, render impossible the continuation of matrimonial cohabitation
with safety, health and self respect. Schwartz v.
Schwartz, 158 Md. 80. ... this Court, concurring with
the chancellor, concludes that her actions did render
it practically impossible for the husband to continue
living with her longer than he did .... His work and
livelihood would have been jeopardized if he had continued, and peaceful living seems to have been impossible.,,50b
The contradiction inherent in this part of the opinion
is obvious. How is it possible for ill-conduct to reach a
point of intensity where it renders "impossible the continuation of matrimonial cohabitation with safety, health
and self respect" and, at the same time, fall short of the
quality of ill-conduct necessary to "justify a divorce on
the ground of cruelty"? Inability to continue "matrimonial
cohabitation with safety, health and self respect" is the
very definition, or more accurately, the description, of legal
cruelty consistently adhered to by the Maryland decisions. 51
The standard for determining legal cruelty and for measuring conduct which amounts to constructive desertion
though it "may not justify a divorce on the ground of
cruelty" is thus identical-which is the practical equivalent
of saying that "cruelty is not cruelty". This contradiction
is traceable directly to a misleading syllabus of the opinion
in Harding v. Harding where the decision of the Court is
summarized as follows:
I See colloquy between counsel and the Chancellor who heard the second
case, Record 21, 183 Md. 369, quoted in the text at post, n. 64.
Italics supplied.
5b Supra, n. 16, 663.
See text at 8upra, n. 14 and 15.
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"Conduct of a husband by which he compels the
wife to leave him and justifies her being awarded a
divorce on the ground of abandonment need not be
such conduct
as would justify a divorce for cruelty of
' ' 1a
treatment. s
The syllabus of the official report does not contain this
statement nor does the opinion of the Court itself. That
portion of Chief Judge Bond's opinion which has been
italicized above is a still further misleading paraphrase of
the syllabus quoted above. As we have already seen, the
Harding case proceeded on the theory that the husband's
conduct did not amount to cruelty but was the equivalent
of "actual desertion". "Constructive desertion" was not relied upon. This unfortunate phrasing in Chief Judge Bond's
opinion left the impression that "cruelty that is not cruelty"
might still amount to constructive desertion. Judge Markell
in Collins v. Collins sought to put the matter to rest by
defining cruelty and declaring:
"... This measure is applicable to cruelty, either
as a ground for divorce or as constituting constructive
desertion. Cruelty is not the only equivalent of constructive desertion. Constructive desertion may consist of conduct, other than cruelty, which makes life
unbearable. 52 . .. But when it consists only of cruelty,
the measure of cruelty is the same as when cruelty
eo nomine is the ground for divorce."5
Perkins Anno. Ed. of 22 Md. 337.
"The Court does not say what this other conduct might be, although it
cites for this proposition in addition to the Kruse case, Schwartz v.
Schwartz, 158 Md. 80, 148 A. 259 (1929) and Fischer ,v. Fischer, 182 Md.
281, 34 A. 2d 455 (1943). The Schwartz case did not involve "constructive
desertion". There the husband actually departed from the home and
sought to Justify his leaving by showing ill-conduct on the part of the wife.
Dicta In the case Indicated that conduct which may not amount to such
cruelty as to warrant affirmative relief may nevertheless be set up as a
defense to a charge of desertion. The Fischer case, which cites the Kruse
case for the proposition that the conduct of one spouse may justify the
other In leaving and obtaining affirmative relief "even though It may not
amount to cruelty", lnvolved failure of the husband to provide a home for
his wife apart from his parents, there being no evidence of cruelty In
the physical sense. This Is one of the four categories of conduct which the
writer believes constitute the only equivalents of constructive desertion.
It Is submitted that Judge Markell, In referring to "conduct other than
cruelty" as an equivalent of constructive desertion, could only have meant
the other three categories of conduct set forth In the text, 8upra.
" Supra, n. 17, 663. In this case there was considerable testimony of
physical -violence on the part of the husband, culminating in an attack
upon the wife with a clothes prop, and the Court held the husband guilty
"1
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In spite of this clear statement of the law, other members of the Court, in subsequent decisions (one at the same
term of Court), continued to quote the language of the
Kruse case (which, as we have seen, was based on the
misleading syllabus to the Harding case) and in at least
two instances actually held that cruelty which is not legal
cruelty is nevertheless constructive desertion.5 4 Such holdof legal cruelty and awarded the wife an a mensa divorce for constructive
abandonment.
" See Miller v. Miller, supra, n. 17, which was decided at the same term
of Court as the Collins case. In the Miller case, however, the Court held
the husband's conduct did not amount to either legal cruelty or constructWe abandonment and the wife was denied relief. See also the following:
Nicodemus v. Nicodemus, aupra, n. 17, where there was evidence of physical
,violence against the wife and over-indulgence in liquor by both parties and
the Court said: "It is not necessary to determine whether the evidence shows
cruelty, as that term has been defined by this Court. . . . The conduct of
the husband was such, in our opinion, as to justify the wife in leaving him
under the decisions summarized in the recent case of Miller v. Miller,
185 Md. 79, 42 A. 2d 915 . . . We therefore hold the husband guilty of
constructive abandonment." Ritz ,v. Ritz, 9upra, n. 30, where the Court
quoted the Kruse case but held that the husband's life and health "were
not sufficiently endangered to justify him in leaving his wife." Robertson
v. Robertson, supra, n. 17, where the language of the Kruse case is quoted,
but it appeared that the Court found legal cruelty (although not expressly), saying with respect to the husband's conduct that it was "well
calculated to put her in fear [and] ... indicative of his desire to terminate
the marital relationship without regard to fault." Geisey v. Geisey, supra,
n. 17, where the language of the Kruse case is paraphrased. This, however,
was a clear case of legal cruelty, although the Court did not expressly
say so. The husband had forbidden the wife to go to the grocery, to ,visit
department stores except under stringent conditions, forbade her to go to
motion pictures; and when he took her out to dinner compelled her to sit
facing the wall, and objected to her association with relatives and friends.
The Court said: "It is difficult to see how a woman could maintain her
health, self respect and reasonable comfort under such conditions." Smith
v. Smith, supra, n. 17, 630, quotes the language of the Kruse case and also
that portion of the Collins opinion which says that "Cruelty is not the
only equivalent of constructive desertion", and demonstrates the ridiculous
end to which the erroneous language of the Kruse case can lead the Court.
The wife's suit for partial divorce was based on cruelty. Her bill of complaint did not charge abandonment. There were ivarious acts of iviolence
relied upon by the wife which the Chancellor apparently felt were sufficient to make out a case of cruelty. On appeal from an a mensa decree
In her favor, the Court of Appeals said: "We do not believe, therefore,
that the conduct of the husband in this case was so .violent, or constituted
such a threat to life, limb or health of the wife, as to amount to 'cruelty'
in the legal sense. However, even though the conduct of the husband did
not amount to legal 'cruelty', we do not think that he is to be excused...
the husband's conduct justified the wife in leaving him, and therefore
* his conduct amounted to constructive desertion." The Court then
found itself confronted with a procedural problem which arose from the
fact that the wife's bill of complaint had not charged abandonment but
only cruelty, and "her proof made out only a case of abandonment." The
Court quickly jumped this hurdle by declaring that since it had power to
remand the case for an amendment of the bill to include an allegation
of abandonment after which a decree would follow as of course, it would
simply affirm the decree and thus arvoid the expense of further litigation.
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ings cannot be justified by Judge Markell's statement that
''cruelty is not the only equivalent of constructive desertion
[which] may consist of conduct other than cruelty, which
makes life unbearable." Although he does not say what
this other conduct might be, the only reasonable inference
is that he had reference to the other three categories of
conduct hereinbefore set forth; namely, (1) cessation of
marital intercourse, (2) refusal of a bona fide offer of
reconciliation, (3) unjustified refusal to maintain a home
separate and apart from parents or other relatives.5
It is thus apparent that constructive desertion in this case was based
solely and exclusively on the husband's alleged acts of physical cruelty, and
the decision went directly in the teeth of Judge Markell's opinion in the
Collins case, wherein he stated that "when [constructive desertion] consists only of cruelty, the measure of cruelty Is the same as when cruelty
eo nomine is the ground for divorce." Eberwein v. Eberwein, supra, n. 17,
where the language of the Kruse case Is quoted at length. This case was
clearly one of cruelty on the part of the wife, although the Court did not
expressly so hold. The Court did say, however, that "the husband could
not with safety to his health and with self-respect continue to live with
his wife."
Cf. Brault v. Brault, 55 A. 2d, 497 (Md. 1947), where the wife, a solitary,
escapist drinker, was guilty of a variety of excesses in her conduct toward
her husband yet the Court held It was not sufficient to establish either
legal cruelty or a justification for the husband's departure. The Kruse
and Ritz cases were distinguished. The Court laid great stress upon the
fact that the husband's claim that his wife was dangerously irresponsible
was inconsistent with his allowing the infant children of the parties to
remain with her for more than six months prior to institution of divorce
proceedings.
15This conclusion finds support in Fischer v. Fischer, supra, n. 53. 282,
where the Court said: "There Is no evidence . . . of cruelty of treatment
In any physical sense. . . . In order to entitle the wife to a divorce. It
must appear from the evidence that she had sufficient cause to leave her
husband. His conduct may give such cause, even though it may not amount
to cruelty. Kruse v. Kruse, 179 Md. 657." The Court then went on to
hold the husband guilty of constructive desertion because of his failure to
furnish the wife a home apart from his relatilves. See also supra, n. 53.
A dictum in Meeks v. Meeks, 54 A. 2d 334 (AMd. 1947), Indicates that a
man's attentions to another woman (though not criminal) may be so
marked as to justify his wife In leafving him and thus amount to constructi-ve desertion. The authorities which recognize this principle place
the offense in the category of legal cruelty. See annotation in 157 A. L. R.
636 ;19 C. J. 62, Sec. 117; 27 C. J. S. 558, Sec. 28. It is generally held, however, that clandestine (as opposed to open and notorious) adultery, although It justifies a wife In separating from her husband, is neither cruelty
nor a ground for inferring a constructive desertion by him. Lake v. Lake.
65 N. J. Eq.. 56 A. 296 (1903) , Tracey v. Tracey, 43 A. 713 (N. J. 1899) :
Stiles v. Stiles, 52 N. J. Eq. 446, 29 A. 162 (1894) ; and see 157 A. L. R.
6M6. It is submitted that under the doctrine of Stewart v. Stewart, 105
Md. 297, 66 A. 16 (1907), (see text at n. 6) adultery may not be treated as
either cruelty or desertion so as to form the basis for a partial divorce.
Except to this limited extent, the question is not too important as In almost
all cases the misconduct would be relied upon by the injured spouse as a
ground for permanent alimony without divorce or as a ground for an
absolute divorce.
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Although Judge Markell has never noted a dissent
from the decisions referred to in the footnote", he took
occasion to say in the recent case of Gambrill v. Gambrill,7
where the wife's charge of constructive desertion based
on alleged acts of cruelty was held not to have been sustained:
"Cruelty that is not cruelty is not constructive desertion . . . In Maryland the policy of the law has
always been not to grant divorces for light and trivial
causes. 'Constructive desertion' is not an equivalent
of any of the catch-alls which in some states help
to
''5
attract a nationwide market for a local industry. 1a
Aside from perpetuating the error of the Harding case
headnote, it is important to observe that the Kruse case
found constructive desertion although the testimony was
wholly devoid of any intent on the part of the wife to bring
about a termination of the marriage relation. With respect
to the wife's efforts to effect a reconciliation, Chief Judge
Bond said:
"The advances were rejected by the husband, he
saying he would rather be dead than live with his wife.
After a long trial of it, cohabitation appears to be impracticable, because of this aversion created by the
is no sufficient promise of the
wife's actions, and there
58
removal of the cause.
Under these circumstances, the husband was clearly entitled to a partial divorce for cruelty, but it is equally clear
under the Lynch case that the wife was not guilty of constructive desertion because her efforts to effect a reconciliation refuted the fatal intent to desert.5 a The Court of
Supra, n. 54.
66 A. 2d 387 (Md. 1949).
57- Ibid., 391.
Supra, n. 17, 661.
Supra, n. 33. In cases involving actual desertion, the Court does not
seem to have any difficulty in holding that intent to desert is refuted by a
bona fide offer of reconciliation. See Crumlick v. Crumlick, supra, n. 1.
Where the Court said that "the intention on the part of the husband to
desert his wife is refuted by" his sincere efforts to effect a reconciliation.
In Pitts iv. Pitts, 181 Md. 182, 189, 29 A. 2d 300 (1942), the Court said,
citing the first Kruse case: "It is true where after a long trial, cohabitation appears impracticable, created by the wife's actions, and
there is no sufficient promise of the removal of the cause, the wife

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. X

Appeals, by holding the wife guilty of constructive desertion, subjected her to a greater penalty than the statute
prescribes for bare cruelty without intent to terminate the
marriage. If the Court had followed the doctrine of the
Lynch case, the wife would have been exposed to no other
penalty and the husband would have been entitled to no
other relief (regardless of the flux of time) than a partial
divorce. But in allowing its reasoning to flow over into the
category of constructive desertion, the Court improperly
opened the door for the procurement of an absolute divorce
by the husband. In effect the Court made bare cruelty, when
coupled with the passage of the statutory period, a ground
for absolute divorce.
The husband in the Kruse case took diligent advantage
of the loop-hole which the Court thus afforded him for complete escape from his matrimonial burden. Pursuing the
usual procedure in this State of following up a partial
divorce with an application for absolute divorce after the
expiration of the statutory period,"9 Kruse filed his bill for
absolute divorce on September 28, 1943, which was three
years and eight months after the filing of the cross-bill
on which the partial divorce was granted. His bill referred
to the original decree and alleged that it was based on
abandonment and desertion. The Chancellor dismissed the
bill on the ground that the husband had exhausted his
remedies in the first case wherein his cross-bill prayed
for an absolute divorce based on a separation for more
than three years prior to the filing of the cross-bill.6 0 This
was the only point involved on appeal in the second Kruse
case. The Court of Appeals, in reversing the Chancellor,
said:
... in view of the fact that the husband throughout the proceedings in the lower court [in fhe first case]
cannot urge the husband's rejection of her offers of reconciliation." But
however impracticable cohabitation may be, the cause of this situation
In the Kruse case just as in the Lynch case, was cruelty without intent to
desert; and although the offer of reconciliation need not be accepted
because of the wife's tried and prqved uncontrollable temper [see po8t,
n. 123] the offer was none the less a sincere and bona fide one, which is
the determining factor in rebutting the fatal Intent and preventing a conversion of cruelty Into constructive desertion.
" Text circa n. 9a.

6 See text circa n. 8.
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insisted that he was entitled to a divorce a vinculo
matrimonii, we are of the opinion that the decree of
December 13, 1940, affirmed by this Court on appeal
is res adjudicata and that it is now improper to examine
the record in that case to determine whether or not the
testimony warranted a decree for divorce a vinculo
matrimonii ... One of the questions decided by the
decree of December 13, 1940, was that the husband,
for some reason appearing to the Chancellor, but now
immaterial, was not entitled to a divorce a vinculo
matrimonii on the ground of abandonment and desertion, either because of its character or of its duration,
but that he was entitled to a divorce a mensa et thoro
because of said abandonment and desertion."'"
This portion of the opinion demonstrates a consistent misconstruction both of the decree of December 13, 1940, and
of the decision in the Lynch case, which was relied upon
both by the Chancellor and the Court of Appeals in the
first Kruse case. The Court assumes that the decree was
based on abandonment and desertion; but it is apparent
that the "reason appearing to the Chancellor" for denying
an absolute divorce to Kruse in the first case was the same
as in the Lynch case where, as we have seen,62 the Court
awarded only a partial divorce because the wife's repeated
efforts to become reconciled rebutted the inference of intent to sever the marriage relation, leaving nothing but
cruelty for which the sole relief provided by the statute
is a divorce a mensa et thoro. The same result was reached
in the earlier Levering case"' and would have been reached
in the Kruse case were it not for the improper application
of the doctrine of constructive desertion on the first appeal.
This is -apparent from the following colloquy between counsel and the Chancellor in the second Kruse case:
"The Court: Did Judge Ulman base his decree [in
the first case] on the cruelty of treatment?
"Mr. Sokol: Yes, he only cited one case. [Lynch v.
Lynch]
6upra,

n. 40, 375.

' Text circa n. 26.

* Text circa n. 19.
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"The Court: The Court of Appeals took a different
view and said it was constructive abandonment."64
Under the doctrine of the Levering and Lynch cases,
the inescapable conclusion is that in such cases the injured
spouse is forever barred from obtaining complete release
from the bonds of matrimony in the absence of a subsequently developed intent to desert on the part of the
offending spouse, continuing for the statutory period, or
some other marital misconduct or occurrence specified by
the statute as a ground for an absolute divorce. However
great the hardship which this doctrine may work in a particular case, the remedy is to be found at the Legislature
64
and not in the Courts. a
Under the decision in the second Kruse case, on an
application for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, a prior decree of divorce a mensa et thoro in favor of the plaintiff is
res adjudicataat least to the extent that the Court will not
"examine the record in [the first] case to determine
whether or not the testimony warranted a decree for
divorce a vinculo matrimonii". It is not clear whether
the Court is also precluded from the essential inquiry as
to whether the a mensa decree was based on cruelty or
on desertion (actual or constructive). Under the practice
in this State,65 when a party has once obtained an a mensa
decree the obtention of the final divorce is a relatively
simple and perfunctory matter, requiring little more than
the patience to wait for the expiration of the statutory
period. The form of the decree a mensa et thoro in almost
universal use throughout the State 6 gives no clue as to
the specific ground on which it is based. In the opinion of
the writer, the basis of the a mensa decree is a most perti" Supra, n. 50.
61 The Court of Appeals has frequently called attention to its inherent
lack of power to enlarge the grounds for divorce or to do more than
follow the statute. See for example the quotation from Crumlick v. Crumlick, supra, n. 1, and Crouch v. Crouch, post, n. 72.
Text circa,n. 9a.
"The vital portion of the decree merely provides as follows: "It is
thereupon, this .......... day of .............. 19.... ; by the Circuit
Court.. . , Adjudged, Ordered and Decreed that the said ..................
the above named complainant be, and he is hereby DIVORCED A MENSA Nr
THORO from the defendant ......................
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nent inquiry, particularly in view of the statute which
authorizes an absolute divorce for abandonment of the
specified character and duration after an a mensa decree
67
has been obtained for abandonment of a lesser duration.
How, except by such an inquiry, can the Court find the
statutory requirement that the complainant "has obtained
a divorce a mensa et thoro on the ground of abandonment"?
Statistics are not available to demonstrate the number of
cases in which decrees a vinculo matrimonii followed as a
matter of course after the expiration of the statutory period
where the prior a mensa decrees were granted solely for
cruelty which did not amount to constructive desertion
because of the absence of intent to terminate the marriage
relation.17 a However small the number of such cases may
be, the evasion of the divorce statute is obvious; for (as has
already been demonstrated) cruelty, which does not amount
to constructive desertion is a ground for partial divorce
only and cannot be converted into a ground for absolute
divorce by the mere passage of time. This evasion is facilitated by the form of divorce decree now in use and the
possible construction of the decision in the second Kruse
case to preclude inquiry as to the basis of the prior a mensa
decree. This situation could be easily remedied by a new
General Equity Rule, which might provide:
Every decree granting a divorce a mensa et thoro
or alimony without a divorce 7 b shall specifically state
the grounds on which the same is based.
Md. Code (1939), Art. 16, Sec. 44: ".. . a party who has obtained a
divorce a menaa et thoro on the ground of abandonment, which at the
time of obtaining said divorce was not of the character and duration
specified in Section 40 of this article, shall not be estopped thereby from
subsequently obtaining a divorce a vinoulo matrimonii on the ground of
abandonment proved to be of the character and duration specified in said
Section 40."
'"aThe only available statistics show a very small percentage of partial
divorces in this State. In 1945, there was a total of 6430 absolute divorces
granted as against 191 partial divorces. In the period between 1929 and
1945 the percentage of partial divorces dropped from 13% of the total
number of divorce and annulment cases to 2.9%. See Bverstine, Divorce
in Maryland, Research Report No. 25, pp. 17, 18, 20. These statistics might
indicate the reasonableness of the proposal that a nenaa divorces be abolished and cruelty be made a ground for absolute divorce. See ibid., pp. 9,
41. Such a change would eliminate most of the problems discussed in this
Article.
6b The writer feels that alimony decrees should be included because in
subsequent divorce proceedings the Court treats the prior alimony decree
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If such a rule had been in effect at the time the a mensa
decree was passed by the Chancellor in the Kruse case there
might never have been a second case.
Although "cruelty that is not cruelty is not constructive
desertion" and cannot be made the basis for affirmative
relief, ill-conduct not in itself a sufficient ground for
divorce may, in a proper case, justify a departure from
the matrimonial domicile and constitute a defense to a
charge of desertion." It has been stated that this rule is
necessary to subserve the interests of public policy and
the sacredness of the marriage tie 9 and to prevent a party
from taking advantage of a condition brought about by
his own misconduct.7 ° In Maryland, little consistency is
as conclusive of fault in the original separation, Mann .v. Mann, 144 Md.
Wise, supra, n. 20; Zuckerberg v. Zucker518, 523, 125 A. 74 (1924) : Wise iv.
berg, supra,n. 20; and it is therefore important to know whether the alimony
decree was based on cruelty or desertion or some other ground, particularly
when one of the questions involved in the subsequent divorce proceeding
Is whether the wife was obligated to accept an offer of reconciliation made
after the passage of the alimony decree. See text, post at n. 123a, n. 123b,
n. 135 and n. 136.
"9 R. C. L. 364, Sec. 150; 17 Am. Jur. 200, Sec. 100; 27 C. J. S. 603,
Sec. 56. See 1 BIsHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, Secs. 1748-1753
for criticism of this rule.
"Polley v. Polley, 128 Md. 60, 97 A. 526 (1916).
0McKane ,v. McKane, 152 Md. 515, 137 A. 288 (1927), citing Childs v..
Childs, 49 Md. 509 (1878). See also 17 Am. Jur., supra, n. 68, 201. The
same principle is applied in cases where cessation of marital intercourse
is relied upon as a constructive desertion (discussed in text, post). In such
cases, it is a good defense to the charge that the complainant brought
about the cessation of the normal intimacy of the marriage relation by
his own harsh conduct (short of cruelty). Owings .v. Owings, 148 Md. 124,
128 A. 748 (1925) ; Kline v. Kline, 169 Md. 708, unreported except In 182
A. 329 (1936); Timanus v. Timanus, 177 Md. 686, 178 Md. 640, 10 A. 2d
322 (1940). (For a strange application of the maxim of "Volenti non fit
injuria" to this type of case see Wysocki *v. Wysocki, 185 Md. 38, 45,
42 A. 2d 909 (1945). See n. 106, post.) But the fact that the husband
does not give his wife as much of his wages as she desired Is no sufficient
cause for her persistent refusal of marital Intercourse. Fries v. Fries, 166
Md. 604, 171 A. 703 (1934). Nor is it a sufficient defense that the wife
has religious scruples against sexual relations so long as a former wife
of the husband, though divorced, Is alive. Jesse v. Jesse, Cir. Ct. of
Baltimore City, Dennis, C. J.; Balto. Daily Record, Jan. 22, 1938.
This principle as applied in divorce cases, although analogous to the
equitable doctrine of "clean hands", has a different origin, having been
first applied in the Ecclesiastical Courts. Childs v. Childs, supra. As to
the applicability of the equitable doctrine of "clean hands" In divorce
cases, see Green v. Green, 125 Md. 141, 93 A. 400 (1915), where the handnote states that the maxim applies, but the opinion Is not conclusive on
the point. Cf., Meeks v. Meeks, supra, n. 55, 337, where the Court said:
"We may assume, however, that the equitable doctrine of 'clean hands'
Is applicable in a divorce court and is not restricted to the defense of
recrimination." And Berman v. Berman, 62 A. 2d 787, (Md. 1948), where
the Court said: ". . . it is unnecessary to decide whether the doctrine
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found either in the statement or application of the rule.71
The basic, and perhaps justifiable, reason for the seeming
inconsistency in applying the rule is that no definite standard can be devised to determine the degree of ill-conduct,
short of what is required for a divorce, which will constitute
a defense to a charge of desertion. As the Court has said:
"In cases of this character it is inadvisable, if not
impossible, to lay down any save the broadest general
rules, because each case must be determined72largely
on its own peculiar facts and circumstances."
In other words, the matter is left to the Court's discretion.7 3
The wisdom of applying the rule under the broad and
[of clean hands] is applicable in a divorce proceeding, a question expressly
left open in Meeks v. Meeks . . . Assuming, without deciding, that it is
applicable and broader than the doctrine of recrimination ... we think the
rule could not be applied under the facts of this case." Application of
the doctrine of "clean hands" was denied In an action for annulment of a
bigamous marriage. Towsend .v. Morgan, 63 A. 2d 743 (Md. 1949), noted in
Note, "Clean Hands" Not Required For Bigamy Annulment (1949) 10
Md., L. Rev. 84. See also text, po8t, at n. 91; also n. 85, post.
"The author of the text in 17 Am. Jur., supra, n. 68 and n. 70, was
apparently so confused by the Maryland decisions on this question that
he cited Schwartz v. Schwartz, supra, n. 53, as sustaining the minority view
that only conduct which authorizes a divorce will Justify a separation
and also for the "prevailing view" that a separation might be Justified by
ill-conduct less than is required for a divorce.
11
Crouch v. Crouch, 150 Md. 608, 618, 133 A. 725 (1926). See also
Schwartz v. Schwartz, supra, n. 53. Both of these cases cite Buchner v.
Buchner, 118 Md. 101. 84 A. 156 (1912).
,"This is the basis of Mr. Bishop's criticism of the rule. At Sec. 1750
of his work, ibid., n. 68, he says: ". . . we have not a particle of enlightenment as to what is the rule to determine the nature and sufficiency of the
ill-conduct justifying a desertion. How much less than is required for a
divorce, or what less, will suffice? Or is there no rule, and Is each case
to be governed by the private opinion of the judge or one of the parties?...
There must be a rule or the possibility of framing one. Now if the
'experience' of one judge enables him to pronounce that the 'female
relatives of the husband' are apt to disquiet the mind of the wife to the
extent of justifying her deserting him should he live In the same town with
them, another judge may have had no wife, or may have had a different
experience with his wife, so this sort of holding could not be extended to
constitute a rule. Some will deem the same thing of smoking by the husband, especially If he buys cheap cigars, yet others will dissent." And in
Sec. 1751: ".... In principle, therefore, as a judicial tribunal is to administer
the law which it finds, not the Individual opinions of the incumbents of
the bench, If It finds specified by legislation certain causes and none other
as adequate for a judicial separation, it cannot act from private ,views of
favoring other causes, and declare a separation for them Justifiable."
The writer, for reasons hereafter stated In the text, cannot agree with
Mr. Bishop's view. The Court in these cases exercises a "Judicial discretion", which is something well understood in the law and quite different
from an expression of the judge's individual and personal opinion. It cannot be denied, however, that the reason for Mr. Bishop's opposition to
leaving the matter to the Court's discretion has considerable force. The
danger of substituting the judge's individual opinion for the requirements
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flexible guidance of a sound judicial discretion is apparent
when we consider the untold ramifications of human conduct, particularly in the intimate relationship between husband and wife. In this realm, as in most other human
affairs, conduct cannot always be pigeon-holed. Without
the right to exercise a judicial discretion, there would be
no way to handle that class of matrimonial dispute where
the complaining spouse has inspired the offense charged
by conduct short of cause for divorce or where a spouse's
justification for living apart arises out of circumstances
and conditions temporary in nature and remedial by the
other spouse. In such cases, the Court must possess the
power to deny relief to either or both of the parties unless
it is shown by one of them that ample opportunity for
correcting the situation has been afforded and rejected or
that the spouse originally justified in living apart persists
in a refusal to resume cohabitation although the conditions
complained of have been corrected."4
The inconsistency to be found in the statement of the
rule is traceable to the same unfortunate phrasing heretofore discussed in connection with those decisions which
apply the same test in spelling out constructive desertion
from conduct less than legal cruelty as they do for legal
cruelty itself. 5 Thus in Polley v. Polley,"6 where the husband successfully defended a charge of deserting his wife
with whom he had lived for twelve years notwithstanding
a syphilitic condition contracted by her prior to marriage
and who had involved him in financial difficulties as a result
of a theft of money from a certain organization, the Court
said, quoting from Cyc.:
of the law are entirely real and were recognized in Crumlick v. Crumlick,
supra, n. 1, where Judge Digges said: "The results consequent upon decisions
of the courts in many divorce cases are far from satisfactory, when viewed
from the standpoint of the future welfare and happiness of the parties
directly concerned, or from the broader viewpoint of society as a whole.
This being true, there Is frequently present the temptation on the part of
the chancellor to make the decree in a particular case conform to his
individual view of what would be most conducive to the contentment and
happiness of the persons directly concerned, or the common welfare."
1 -See Crouch v. Crouch, supra, n. 72, hereafter discussed in the text, as
an Illustration of this type of case.
" See text following n. 50.
7
1Supra, n. 69.
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"'It would seem to subserve the interests of public
policy and the sacredness of the marriage tie, however,
to permit a spouse to set up in defense of his or her
desertion such misconduct on the part of the other as
would render it impossible to continue the matrimonial
cohabitation with safety, health and self respect, although the misconduct is not in itself a sufficient
ground for divorce....... his refusal to live longer
with the appellee has been caused by such misconduct
on the part of the wife, as renders it impossible to continue the matrimonial cohabitation with safety to his
health and self respect."
The case of Schwartz v. Schwartz,7 where the rule was
similarly stated but not applied, demonstrates the confusion of thought and phrasing involved in the difficult task
of determining what degree of ill-conduct (short of what
is required for divorce) is adequate as a defense to a charge
of desertion. In this case, the wife filed a bill for a partial
divorce on the ground of desertion, and the husband filed
a cross-bill on the same ground. The parties were a middle
aged couple, both with grown children by a former marriage. They established their domicile in the wife's home,
and the children of each spouse resided with them. There
were frequently quarrels between the members of these illassorted families. Schwartz's children resented his second
wife and were markedly disrespectful to her. At his wife's
request, Schwartz established his children in another home,
but shortly thereafter he left his wife and went to live with
his children. Schwartz contended that he had invited his
wife to join him in his new home and that he had left her
home because of her mistreatment of his children, her
nagging and abusive conduct. The Court found that
Schwartz had not in good faith sought to have his wife join
him in the home to which he had moved and that she was
therefore not guilty of desertion. The Court further found
that her quarrels with his children did not constitute such
misconduct on her part as justified his leaving and defending against the charge of desertion. With respect to the
" Supra, n. 53,
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husband's claim of justification in leaving his wife, Judge
Offutt said:
"... it is said in 9 R. C. L. page 364: 1 'Though the
authorities are not in accord, some cases holding that
to justify one spouse in leaving the other on account
of the latter's ill-treatment or misconduct, and to deprive the latter of the right to a divorce on the ground
of desertion, the ill-treatment or misconduct must be
such as to entitle the former to a divorce, yet according
to the prevailing view, especially in this country, illtreatment or misconduct of the husband, of such a degree or under such circumstances as not to amount to
cruelty for which the wife would be entitled to sue
for a divorce against him, might yet justify her in leaving his house and prevent his obtaining a divorce, for
her desertion if she did so.' And while that conclusion,
in so far as it speaks of the 'prevailing view', goes too
far, it is at least the law of this State, subject, however,
to the qualification that no conduct will justify a separation unless it is such 'as would render it impossible
to continue the matrimonial cohabitation with safety,
health and self respect'. 19 C. J. S. 80, secs. 181, 116117."
This is the equivalent of saying that the misconduct must
amount to legal cruelty justifying a divorce. There is, of
course, no way of determining what Judge Offutt had in
mind when he concluded the quotation (from 19 C. J. S.
80, Sec. 181), without adding the last clause of the sentence, which reads: "although the misconduct is not in
itself a sufficient ground for divorce"-citing as authority
Polley v. Polley, discussed above.
In Singewald v. Singewald, where the wife was denied
affirmative relief because the defendant's conduct did not
measure up to the requirements of legal cruelty, Judge
Offutt, again speaking for the Court, cited, among others,
the same authorities relied upon in the Schwartz case and
said:
...we have intentionally refrained from deciding
that the act of the wife in leaving the husband was an
act of desertion, since that question is not directly
"Reference is made to Sec. 150, see supra, n. 68.
165 Md. 136, 166 A. 441 (1933).
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presented by the appeal, and there may be cases in
which, while the conduct of the erring party would not
constitute cruelty, it might nevertheless excuse the
act of the injured party in leaving the common home.
Nelson on Marriage & Divorce, sec. 89; 19 C. J. 80;
Polley v. Polley, 128 Md. 66, 97 A. 526; 9 R. C. L. 150."
Perhaps the Court here had in mind such cases as
0 McKane v. McKane81 and Nickel
Crouch v. Crouch,"
v.
2
Nickel, although no reference was made to them. Indeed,
the decision in these cases cannot be explained or justified
on any other ground.
In Crouch v. Crouch, the Court in effect held that the
husband was not entitled to a divorce for his wife's desertion because she was justified in leaving his home; but that
notwithstanding such justification, she was not entitled
to a divorce against him. Crouch had living with him in
the household an insane brother, who on one occasion
had become violent and had severely frightened the wife.
Medical testimony was to the effect that the brother might
again become violent, and the wife requested that the
brother be removed from the home. The husband was not
opposed to removing the brother and in fact was making
arrangements to do so. In the meantime, relations between
the parties became strained as a result of quarrels concerning collateral matters, and the wife left the home
without warning to her husband. At the time of her departure, arrangements for removing the brother had not
yet been completed but there had been no fresh outbreak
by the brother to justify the wife's sudden departure. Within two days of her departure the wife filed a suit for partial
divorce on the ground of cruelty. The husband filed a
cross-bill for desertion. The Court indicated that although
the keeping of an insane brother in the house would ordinarily amount to cruelty justifying a divorce, the evidence
showed that the husband had arranged to remove the
brother; and the wife's sudden departure did not give the
husband adequate opportunity to consummate the arrangeS
Supra,
n. 72.
Supra, n. 70.
S150 Md. 702, 137 A. 915 (1926).
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ments. Accordingly, the Court held, the wife was not entitled to a divorce. On the other hand, the Court denied
relief to the husband because the presence of the insane
brother in the home justified the wife's leaving until the
brother was removed. The struggle which the Court had
in deciding this difficult case is reflected in the following
language of the opinion:
"... the appellant ... could not require his wife
to live in the same house with [the insane brother]
and we accordingly cannot treat the wife's leaving
as being sufficiently unjustified to constitute desertion
on her part. The case is a difficult one to decide, but
taking into consideration the interest which the State
has in the maintenance of the marriage relation, and
looking at the evidence as a whole, we are convinced
that neither of these parties is entitled to a divorce.
"In cases of this character it is inadvisable, if not
impossible, to lay down any save the broadest general
rules, because each case must be determined largely
on its own peculiar facts and circumstances .... In the
present case, it can be strongly urged that the presence
of the brother for four months in the husband's home
justified the wife in breaking off the marriage and
suing for a divorce, but against this the record shows
that during this time the brother did nothing offensive
or dangerous ... that the wife gave no definite warning
of her intention to leave . . . and finally . . . that at
the time the wife left the husband was making arrangements to have his brother removed. Under these circumstances we do not think the wife is entitled to a
divorce. On the other hand, it can also be urged that
if she is not entitled to a divorce then her leaving
constituted desertion on her part entitling the husband
to a divorce. This latter contention, however, loses
sight of her right to decline to live with her husband
as long as his brother remained in their home. It is
not every separation of husband and wife that entitles
one or the other to a divorce. 'There must be an actual
breaking off of the matrimonial cohabitation, coupled
with an intent in the mind of the offender to desert
or abandon the other.' 19 C. J. 58. In the present
case, however, the wife can hardly be said to be the
offender, because she had a right to decline to live in
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the same house with the husband's afflicted brother,
and hence, since her leaving was justified, her intention
in doing so is immaterial, and will remain so until the
brother is removed. It accordingly follows that under
the testimony now before us the husband has failed
to show any desertion by the wife entitling him to any
relief." 8
In McKane v. McKane, 4 the wife sued for a partial
divorce on the ground of excessively vicious conduct and
cruelty, allegedly manifested by the husband's disposition
to get drunk and call her vile names. The husband filed
a cross-bill for desertion because of the wife's refusal to
admit him to her bedroom. The Court denied the wife
relief because the husband's conduct did not amount to
legal cruelty. The husband was denied relief because his
misconduct, although not a ground for divorce, was serious
enough to justify the wife's taking a separate bedroom.,
In Nickel v. Nickel, s6 where the parties lived with the
husband's family under uncongenial conditions, the Court
denied the wife a divorce because it did not appear that
she had demanded a home separate and apart from the
husband's family or that the husband could have afforded
to comply with such a demand. Nevertheless, the Court
further held that the wife, in leaving the husband under
such circumstances, was not guilty of desertion so as to
I Spra, fi. 72, 617. Recognizing the anomalous situation in which the
parties were left, the Court said, supra, n. 72, p. 619: "It apears from the
record that both of these parties now refuse to live together, and the situation in which they find themselves is undoubtedly regrettable, but the Court
is not responsible for their errors of omission or commission, and we cannot grant either or both of them relief simply because their matrimonial
affairs have gotten into an unfortunate tangle."
Supra, n. 70.
The Court said, ibid., 520: "It was held in Childs v. Childs, [49 Md. 514],
that where a husband by his misconduct induces such behavior on the part
of the wife as would be just cause for complaint, but for his own misconduct,
and, without first seeking a remedy In the reform of his own conduct,
separates from his wife, and after the separation Is forbidden by her to
return again to her, such act of the wife forbidding the husband to return
will not entitle him to a dtvorce on the ground of abandonment." The principle here announced originated in the Ecclesiastical Courts; and although
it has some analogy to the equitable doctrine of "clean hands", it is not the
same thing. See Childs iv. Childs, 8upra, n. 70, 513. See also n. 70, supra.
In Childs v. Childs, supra, n. 70, the wife was permitted to defend a
charge of desertion on the ground that the husband had utterly failed to
support her. (It is to be observed that the Court has held mere failure
to support not to amount to desertion. Sause v. Sause, suprd, n. 22).
MSupra,n. 82.
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entitle the husband to a divorce against her, it appearing
that she had been treated as an outcast by his family,
that the husband did not resent this and spent much of
his time with his family in that part of the house occupied
by them, leaving her neglected and alone.
In Simmont v. Simmont,s7 the Court held that although
the wife's attention to another man who lived in the same
house was not in itself "sufficient cause to justify him in
abandoning her, . . . [it was] sufficient to justify him in
leaving the house which [the other man] occupied, and his
action in so doing cannot be characterized as desertion, if
he offered to provide another home"s Ta for his wife.
The decision in Crumlick v. Crumlick"8 applied the rule
of "sufficient for defense but not for affirmative relief"
to a situation in which the wife clearly appeared guilty of
desertion. There was no express reference made to the
rule, but (like the decision in the Crouch case) there is no
other basis for explaining the Court's conclusion. Both
parties charged the other with desertion. The evidence
showed that after some unpleasantness between the parties
due to the presence of the wife's parents in the home, the
husband moved to a hotel which the parties owned and
managed, declaring that he would stay there until the wife's
parents left. Thereafter, the husband earnestly sought
reconciliation and returned to the home. The wife refused
to resume relations and left the home. Four days later she
filed her bill. The Court denied relief to the wife because
the husband's actions lacked the necessary intent to desert.
Relief was also denied to the husband because "under the
circumstances of this case the action of the wife in leaving
home under the conditions here shown, with the belief that
she had a legal ground for divorce against her husband,
as shown by the filing of her bill four days after leaving,
does not constitute desertion by her." 9
160 Md. 422, 153 A. 665 (1931).
8ThIbid., 430.

8 Supra, n. 1.
1 Ibid., 387. Compare, however, the ruling in McClees v. McClees, 162
Md. 70, 74, 158 A. 349 (1932), where under somewhat different circumstances
the Court said: "Since the wife left the husband without the commission
-by him of some distinct matrimonial offenac upon which a decree of Judicial
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It is settled that a charge of desertion cannot be defended by a showing of a quarrelsome disposition on the
part of the complainant"0 or that the complainant was cold,
indifferent and uncooperative in according the defendant
his marital rights. 1
In any case where a party asserts the affirmative defense of justification for leaving the home, he or she carries
the burden of establishing it.92
The recent case of Hyatt v. Hyatt,9 3 creates considerable

uncertainty about the rule that conduct not in itself ground
for a divorce may yet justify one spouse in leaving and
afford a defense to an action for divorce. In that case the
wife sued for a divorce on the ground of desertion. The
husband attempted to justify his departure by showing
that shortly after the marriage the wife became extravagant and spent most of his earnings, that she incessantly
cursed and nagged him, and that "the only way to avoid
it was to leave". The Court, however, rejected this defense
and stated that the wife was entitled to a decree, unless
the defendant-husband could".. . show that the plaintiff was guilty of adultery

...or that she was guilty of such excessively vicious
conduct or such cruelty as to justify his leaving her.
In other words, if he defends on either of the two latter
grounds he must show such facts' ' as would entitle him
to a decree had he filed the bill. Osa
This language ignores the rule under discussion and applies
the technical defense of recrimination. 4 In the subsequent
separation could have been granted, her desertion began when she left,
and was not intercepted by the divorce proceeding which she later unsuccessfully began." (Italics supplied.) Aside from the nugatory effect of
prompt institution of divorce proceedings, the language, italicized, appears
in direct conflict with the rule of "sufficient for defense but not for affirmatiive relief". See text, post.
.o Bounds iv. Bounds, 135 Md. 220, 108 A. 870 (1919).
"Wilson v. Wilson, 152 Md. 632, 137 A. 354 (1927) ; Kline iv. Kline, supra,
n. 70.
Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Md. 513, 154 A. 95 (1931).
"173 Md. 693, unreported except in 196 A. 317 (1938).
Ibid., 317.
"See 19 C. J. 77, 94, Secs. 171, 220. "Misconduct of complainant constituting a defense on the ground of prQvocation, justification or excuse, need
not be such as in itself would entitle defendant to a divorce, thus distinguishing it from misconduct constituting the defense of recrimination,
which must of itself be sufficient as a ground for divorce." Ibid., See. 171.
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case of Meeks v. Meeks, 5 where the rule of "sufficient for
defense but not for affirmative relief" was not strictly applicable because the plaintiff-husband's alleged misconduct
(association with other women) 9 originated subsequent to
the wife's desertion, the Court discussed the relation of
the equitable doctrine of "clean hands" to the defense of
recrimination without either adopting the doctrine for
divorce cases or considering the extent to which it impinged
upon the rule under discussion, saying:
"The defense of recrimination can be sustained only
by proof of a marital offense which would constitute
ground for divorce. We may assume, however, that
the equitable doctrine of 'clean hands' is applicable
in a divorce court and is not restricted to the defense
of recrimination. But 'equity does not demand that
its suitors shall have led blameless lives'. . . . This
Court has repeatedly held (and now holds) that
divorces should not be granted for light or trivial
causes; but few opinions in divorce cases indicate that
the conduct of either of the parties has been exemplary." 7
The most recent cases,"8 in which the rule under discussion could properly have been applied, make no reference to it and appear to proceed on the assumption that
no ill-conduct will constitute a defense to a charge of
desertion unless it mounts up to a ground for divorce-in
other words, technical recrimination. It may be that such
cases as Crouch v. Crouch and Crumlick v. Crumlick have
been relegated to the limbo of forgotten decisions. The
writer, however, ventures an opinion that the Court will
not hesitate to disinter them when confronted with a hard
case in which it feels the parties ought not to be divorced.
See also, supra, n. 70. For the requirements of technical recrimination see
Green v. Green, supra, n. 70; Martin v. Martin, 141 Md. 182, 118 A. 410
(1922) ; Pryor v. Pryor, 146 Md.683 (1924) ; Appeltofft v. Appeltofft, 147 Md.
603, 128 A. 273 (1925) ; Meeks v. Meeks, supra, n. 55, quoted in text, post.
Supra, n. 55.
See n. 55, supra.
Supra, n. 55, 337. See n. 70 and n. 85, supra, where it is shown that the
rule under discussion is not grounded on the equitable doctrine of "clean
hands."
1 See Stevens v. Stevens, supra, n. 24; Ritz v. Ritz, 8upra, n. 30; Brault
v. Brault, supra,n.54.
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2. Cessation of marital intercourse without just cause
In the marriage relation, sexual intercourse between the
parties is a reciprocal privilege and obligation of the most
sacred character. The law recognizes and protects it by
declaring the spouse who unjustifiably withdraws from this
normal intimacy guilty of matrimonial desertion. This has
been the settled law on the subject in this State since the
decision in Fleegle v. Fleegle.9 The Court of Appeals has
expressly declared this type of marital misconduct to be a
constructive desertion.' This seems an entirely reasonable
classification as the offense does not involve an actual desertion in the sense of a departure from the matrimonial domicile, although to a certain extent there is a partial physical
withdrawal.
To make out a case of constructive desertion it must
be shown that the withdrawal from marital relations was
permanent and irrevocable with intent to sever the marriage relation.'' Thus where the husband moved to a
separate room merely to avoid the wife's nagging and to
get a night's sleep or because the wife complained of noise
from the husband's alarm clock, there was no desertion. 10 2
The mere fact that the parties occupy separate bedrooms
is not evidence of cessation of intercourse nor of intent
-136 Md. 630, 110 A. 889 (1920), Martin v. Martin, supra, n. 89; Ruckle
v. Ruckle, 141 Md. 207, 118 A. 472 (1922) ; Roth v. Roth, 145 Md. 74, 145
A. 556 (1924); Klein (v. Klein, 146 Md. 27, 125 A. 728 (1924) ; Owings ,v.
Owings, supra, n. 70; Irr v. Irr, 150 Md. 313, 133 A. 56 (1926) ; McKane iv.
McKane, supra, n. 70; Wilson v. Wilson, supra, n. 91; Beach v. Beach, 159
Md. 647; 152 A. 365 (1930) ; Crumlick iv. Crumlick, 8upra, n. 1; Fries v.
Fries, supra, n. 70; Wagner iv. Wagner, 166 Md. 705, unreported, per
curiam opinion in 172 A. 927 (1934) ; Kline v. Kline, supra, n. 70; Shpritz
v. Shpritz, 174 Md. 695, unreported except in 200 A. 363 (1938) ; Dotterwelch ,v. Dotterweich, 174 Md. 697, unreported except in 200 A. 523 (1938) :
Faulknerv. Faulkner, 176 Md. 692, 4 A. 2d 117 (1939) ; Timanus iv. Timanus,
supra,n. 70; Wysocki v. Wysocki, supra, n. 70; Jones v. Jones, 186 Md. 312.
46 A. 2d 617 (1946).
11 Kline v. Kline, ibid.; Shpritz v. Shpritz, ibid.; Dotterweich rv. Dotterwelch, ibid.; Faulkner iv. Faulkner, ibid. See also Jessa v. Jessa, supra.
n. 70. Cf., however, NELsoN, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT, Sec. 4.14, where the
author regards such misconduct as an actual desertion.
101Fleegle iv. Fleegle, supra, n. 99; Ruckle v. Ruckle, supra, n. 99; Irr
v. Irr, supra, n. 99; Wysocki v. Wysocki, supra, n. 70; Jones iv. Jones, supra,
n. 99. See also opinion of Frank, J., In Lissey iv. Lissey, Circuit Court No.
2 of Baltimore City, Daily Rec., Apr. 11, 1941, affirmed 180 Md. 689, unreported except in 23 A. 2d 39 (1941).
101Cases cited ibid.
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to desert as this is not necessarily a withdrawal of the
marital right, "for that right may continue and be exercised
thereafter under the changed conditions, with the full understanding and approval of both."' 3 Nothing short of
an actual request and persistent refusal will constitute
Mere coolness, indifference and
constructive desertion.'
failure to cooperate in the act is not sufficient.1 05 Under the
principle that a party cannot complain of a condition
brought about by his own misconduct,' where the cessation of marital relations is attributable to the husband's
persistently harsh treatment of his wife, relief will not be
granted." 7 But a wife is not justified in withdrawing the
privilege merely because her husband does not give her as
much of his wages as she desires, 08 or because she has
religious scruples against sexual relations so long as a
former wife of the husband, though divorced, is alive,0 9 or
because she has an unfounded fear of contracting a venereal
disease. 1' The Court has declared that the marital obligation includes not only the wife's duty of submission upon
reasonable request of the husband, but also the husband's
duty of forbearance upon reasonable request of the wife;
and not only is the wife justified in refusing demands which
are excessive in nature or made at times when intercourse
may cause her serious injury, but such conduct on the part

11 Ruckle v. Ruckle, ibid.; Roth v. Roth, supra, n. 99; Owings iv. Owings.,
8upra, n. 70; Beach v. Beach, supra, n. 99; Wysocki ,v. Wysocki, 8upra, ii.
70; Jones v. Jones, supra, 1. 99. See also Fischer v. Fischer (Md. 1949).
No. 2 Oct. Term 1949 (Daily Record, Nov. 15, 1949), where the Court made
the following critical comment on this factual situation: "This is one of
those all too frequent divorce cases where parties request a legal separation
because of cessation of marital activities while continuing to live in the
same house."
101Kline v. Kline, 8upra, n. 70.
Wilson v. Wilson, supra, n. 99; Kline tv. Kline, ibid.
'
See text at n. 70 and n. 91. 'See Wysocki rv. Wysocki, supra, n. 70, 45.
for a somewhat strange application of the maxim of "Vole.ti non fit injuria" in holding that the wife could not obtain relief for her husband's
refusal to have intercourse where she was afraid to engage in the act
because of an unfounded fear of contracting a -venereal disease. The Court
said: "She thus brings herself within the scope of this maxim that a person
who is willingly injured is not injured, as a matter of law."
upra, n. 70: Timanus
107 Owings v. Owings, supra, n. 70; Kline v. Kline,
v. Timanus, supra, n.70.
108Fries v. Fries, 8upra, n.70.
1o9
Jessa v. Jessa, 8upra, n. 70.
110
Wysocki w,.
Wysocki, supra, n. 70, quoted at n. 106, supra.
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of the husband may amount to cruelty, entitling the wife
to a divorce."'
The dual problem presented in every divorce action of
meeting the ordinary burden of proof and satisfying the
statutory requirement of corroboration is particularly difficult in cases of the character under discussion." 2 As the
Court said in Jones v. Jones: '
"The case presents a situation where the claimed
abandonment was the refusal to continue marital relations while the parties were living in the same house.
In some jurisdictions it is required that such abandonment be notorious and known to the community in
which the parties lived. That is not the law of this
State, but the fact that it is the law elsewhere emphasizes the difficulties of the ordinary proof in such cases.
It is very easy to set up such a claim if the parties are
in collusion, and where there is no defense the testimony must be carefully scrutinized to see if the facts
are clearly proved. Where the case is contested as in
the proceedings before us, the inherent difficulty of
establishing the facts, does not relieve the complainant
from furnishing the corroboration required by the
statute.... It is true that where there is no possibility
of collusion, only slight corroboration is necessary....
However, the corroboration must be present."
We have already seen that a mere showing that the parties
occupied separate rooms is not sufficient to establish the
offense under discussion. In some of the cases which state
this proposition, both sides admitted the cessation of intercourse, and the necessity for corroboration was in reality
limited to the issue of who was responsible for the condition."1 4 Of course, in the face of a denial by the party
" Griest iv. Grtest, 154 Md. 696, unreported, 140 A. 590 (1928) : Hockman
v. Hockman, 184 Md. 473, 41 A. 2d 510 (1945).
112 Md. Code, Art. .5,
Sec. 4; Owings v. Owings, supra, n. 99; Shpritz v.
Shpritz, sitpra, n. 99; Dotterweich v. Dotterweich, .supra. n. 99: Jones v.
Jones, supra, n. 99.
"a Ibid., 313.

"1 See for example Owings v. Owings, supra, n. 70, where the divorce was
denied because there was no corroboration of the husband's charge that
the admitted cessation of intercourse was due to the wife's fault. In
Faulkner v. Faulkner, supra, n. 99, the relief was granted where the Court
accepted testimony of a son of the parties as corroborating the wife's
claim that the husband was responsible for the admitted cessation of intercourse. The Court also referred to certain entries In the wife's diary as
supporting her claim that her husband refused to have relations with her.
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charged, it is a virtual impossibility (except, perhaps, in
a case of virginity) to obtain corroboration of the bare,
isolated fact of nonintercourse. Indeed, none of the cases
turn on such a narrow question but involve the more complicated issues of responsibility for the cessation of intercourse,
whether there was a refusal in the legal sense, whether
it was a mere temporary withdrawal lacking the requisite
1
intent to desert, whether the refusal was justified, etc."'
n5 In addition to the cases cited, ibid., see the following cases where the
divorce was granted: Roth .v. Roth, supra, n. 99, corroboration of husband's
claim of refusal being found In wife's declarations to third persons that
she wanted her husband to get out and live elsewhere and let her alone;
that she would never be his wife; and that she had refused a reconciliation
because it was too late. Further corroboration was found in the wife's Inconsistent defense. In a prior suit for divorce instituted against the husband she had charged him with cruelty necessitating her leaving his bed;
whereas in the instant case, wherein the husband was plaintiff, she denied
the alleged refusal of relations and asserted that she left her husband's
room in order to sleep with her youngest son, and that it was understood
that the plaintiff could "visit there whenever he got good and ready".
Klein v. Klein, supra, n. 99, where the wife took a separate room and corroboration was apparently found in the fact that she put locks on the doors
of her room and nailed the doors to the floor. Fries v. Fries, supra, n. 70,
where the cessation of Intercourse was due to the wife's dissatisfaction
with the amount of allowance furnished by the husband, and the Court
did not specifically discuss the question of corroboration. Dotterweich v.
Dotterweich, supra, n. 99, where the Court merely said: ". . . there is . . .
enough of admissions of the husband's complaints as to justify the conclusion of the Chancellor that there had been a constructive desertion and
abandonment of the plaintiff by the defendant on the ground and for the
reasons stated In Fleegle v. Fleegle, 136 Md. 630 and Klein v. Klein, 146
Md. 27."
In the following cases the dtvorce was denied: Ruckle .v. Ruckle, 8upra,
n. 99, Where no question of corroboration was involved. There was no intent
to desert, it appearing that the husband took a separate room merely for
the purpose of avoiding a quarrel and getting a night's sleep. Irr v. Irr,
supra, n. 99, was a similar case. McKane v. McKane, supra, n. 70, corroboration not involved. The husband's conduct in coming home drunk and using
vile epithets was held to justify the wife's withdrawal. Beach .v. Beach,
supra, n. 99, where the wife's refusal was held not established by occupancy
of a separate room, particularly since there was testimony that the parties
slept together within two weeks of the plaintiff-husband's departure. Wagner v. Wagner, supra, n. 99, where cessation of relations was admitted,
but the defendant wife asserted that It was the plaintiff-husband himself
who had ceased relations, entirely of his own initiative and preference.
The Court said: "There were no other witnesses to the fact, and incidents
to which counsel on one side and the other refer for corroboration do not
In the opinion of this Court afford sufficient ground for differing from the
lower Court." Shpritz ,v. Shpritz, supra, n. 99, where the Court said
that the husband's testimony "is not sufficiently corroborated and does
not gain belief". Wysocki v. Wysocki, supra, n. 70, quoted at n. 106, s8upra,
where non-intercourse was admitted but the Court held there was no corroboration of the husband's refusal in the legal sense. Defendant-husband
denied he had "refused" relations, and the Court found that the wife,
who had an unfounded fear of contracting a venereal disease, was a willing
party to the discontinuance of relations. Jones v. Jones, supra, n. 99, where
non-intercourse was admitted, but the evidence showed that the defendant-
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As a practical matter, it is to these broader issues that
the corroborative evidence must be directed." 6
3. Refusal of a bona fide offer of reconciliation
A. In general-If one spouse leaves the other without
cause and repents and proposes to renew the cohabitation,
and that other refuses, it constitutes desertion by the one
refusing from the time of the refusal; provided the offer
to return is made in good faith, is free from improper
qualifications and conditions, and is really intended to be
carried out in accordance with the duties and obligations
of the marital relation."7 The duty to make an overture
is upon the erring spouse. The innocent spouse is under
no obligation to seek out the other and urge a resumption
of relations."" However, where the spouses are living apart
without fault for the separation being chargeable to either,
or without legal grounds for separation, each is under a
duty to make reasonable efforts to effect a reconciliation
and neither can charge the other with desertion unless he
or she has earnestly and in good faith made such an
effort." 9 The voluntary character of a separation which
wife sought resumption of relations. With respect to the plaintiff husband's
charge and the evidence in support thereof, the Court said: "So far from
corroborating it, It is, in effect, a denial. It tends to support the position
of the wife that it was he, and not she, who was guilty of the abandonment." Fischer v. Fischer, supra, n. 103, where non-intercourse was admitted but the Court accepted the Chancellor's conclusion that "The up-shot
of the whole story is that the Court Is convinced it is practically a cessation
of hostilities by mutual consent".
f"The
Court has recently declared that the "corroboration required by
the Statute to support the testimony of the plaintiff in a divorce suit need
not go to every particular of the case. It is considered sufficient if it gives
substantial support to the plaintiff's testimony of material and controlling
facts". Hahn v. Hahn, 64 A. 2d 739, 743 (Md. 1949).
"7Downs v. Downs, 154 Md. 430, 140 A. 831 (1928) ; Simmont v. Simmont,
supra, n. 87; McClees v. McClees, 8upra, n. 89; Kirkwood v. Kirkwood, 165
Md. 547, 170 A. 180 (1934) ; Kline v. Kline, supra, n. 70; Pitts v. Pitts, 181
Md. 182, 29 A. 2d 300 (1942); Geisey v. Geisey, supra, n. 17; Miller rv.
Miller, 62 A. 2d 293 (Md. 1948) ; Schofer .v. Schofer, 62 A. 2d 565 (Md. 1948).
If the offer is inadequate because lacking the requisites stated in the text,
the offeree is not guilty of desertion by accepting it conditionally. As stated
in Wise v. Wise, supra, n. 20, 600: "But an unqualified refusal by her of
the indirect and inadequate overtures made in this case would not seem
to us so unjustified as to convict her of abandonment, and certainly her
conditional acceptance should not affect her more unfalvorably than a
definite declination."
m Miller v. Miller, 178 Md. 12, 11 A. 2d 630 (1940) ; Diamond v. Diamond,
182 Md. 103, 32 A. 2d 376 (1943) ; Miller ,v. Miller, supra, n. 1.
I"Dearholt v. Dearholt, 178 Md. 405, 13 A. 2d 538 (1940) ; Wysocki rv.
Wysocki, supra, n.. 70.
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originated in the mutual consent of the parties is terminated by a proper overture of reconciliation by one of
the parties. 12 0 The spouse to whom the overture for reconciliation is made is entitled to a reasonable time to consider
it before a charge of desertion can be brought against the
offeree."' The duty to accept a bona fide offer of reconciliation is clear where it appears with reasonable certainty
that such offer may be accepted without any reasonable
sacrifice of self-respect, health, safety or comfort. 122 But
where after a long trial, cohabitation appears impracticable
because of the repentant spouse's conduct, and there is no
sufficient promise of removal of the cause, it seems that
even a bona fide offer of reconciliation need not be accepted. 1 23 In cases where the original separation was due
to the offeror's cruelty, the mere bona fides of the offer is
not enough to require acceptance. As the Court said in
Wise v. Wise: 123a
"The determination of the question as to whether
the appellant was wrong in her refusal to live again
with the appellee depends on the kind and degree of
mistreatment to which she was previously subjected.
It was incumbent upon him to prove that the causes
and circumstances of the separation were not such as
to prevent his wife, with due regard to her safety,
comfort and self
respect, from accepting his proposal
'' 2
for a reunion. l 3b
u°Downs v. Downs, supra, n. 117; Riland v. Riland, Cir. Ct. No. 2 of
Baltimore City, Frank J., Daily Record, Apr. 10, 1941, where the offer of
reconciliation was held a good defense to a divorce on the ground of
voluntary separation. See also, post, n. 145.
121 Kline v. Kline, 179 Md. 10, 15, 16 A. 2d 924 (1940).
l Simmont v. Slimont, supra, n. 87, 432; Brault v. Brault, supra,n. 54.
" Kruse v. Kruse, 8upra, n. 17; Pitts ,N. Pitts, supra, n. 117. See also
Kline v. Kline, s8pra, n. 70, where aside from the fact that the husband's
offer was not sincere, the Court Indicated its disfavor of reconciliation in
this case because of the unlikelihood of its permanency.
See supra, n. 58a, for discussion of the effect of a rejection of an offer
in such cases on the question of rebuttal of Intent to desert on the part
of the offeror.
ul Supra, n. 20, 599.
"b In this case the offer was made through a third party and the Court
found It was not sincere. There was a further complicating factor in
that the parties were living apart under a separate maintenance decree in
favor of the wife, but this circumstance does not, in the writer's opinion,
alter the rule as stated in the text. See also Zuckerberg v. Zuckerberg,
8upra, n. 20, which was a similar case of parties living apart under a separate maintenance decree, and in which the Court held the husband's offer
of reconciliation was not sincere. In the Massachusetts case of Slavinsky
v. Slavlnsky, supra, n. 20, 828, the rule was stated as follows: "If It [the
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There is no inflexible rule for determining whether an
offer of reconciliation meets the requirements of bona fides,
freedom from unwarranted conditions and compatibility
with the safety and self respect of the offeree. Each case
is controlled by its own particular facts and circumstances.
A safe indicium of bad faith, however, may be found in
the fact that the offeror has retained copies of letters in
which the overtures were made.1280
B. Offer made subsequent to filing bill of complaint
or after flux of statutory period.
The general rule is settled that a divorce decree must
be based upon acts, conduct and transactions occurring
before the institution of suit.'24 On principle, therefore,
an offer of reconciliation made after the filing of the complaint is too late and need not be accepted, although evidence of the belated overture may be received in corroboration of the bona fides of prior offers or as reflecting upon
intent or the fault of the parties with respect to their separation.'25 The Maryland cases which deal with this subject
wife's separate maintenance decree] was in truth granted on the ground
of cruel and abusive treatment, manifestly the offer of the husband to
furnish a home and live with his wife would be unavailing regardless of
his 'good faith' without proof that the wife, if she accepted his offer, would
be free from reasonable apprehension for her bodily safety and was otherwise required to accept the offer."
113Pitts v. Pitts, supra, n. 117; Nicodemus v. Nicodemus, supra, n. 17:
Zuckerberg v. Zuckerberg, ibid. See also cases discussed in text, post, involving offers made post litent motem.
-2 Simmont v. Simmont, supra, n. 87; McClees v. McClees, supra, n. 89;
Kirkwood .v. Kirkwood, 8upra, n. 117; Dearholt v. Dearholt, supra, n. 119.
For statement and application of this rule in cases invol ving adultery, see
Schwab v. Schwab, 96 Md. 592, 54 A. 653 (193); Wagner v. Wagner,
130 Md. 346, 100 A. 364 (1917) ; Carter v. Carter, 139 Md. 265, 114 A. 902
(1921) ; Sterling v. Sterling, 145 Md. 63, 125 A. 809 (1924) ; Williams ,v.
Williams, 156 Md. 10, 142 A. 510 (1925).
122Cases cited ibid. See also Backus iv. Backus, 167 Md. 19, 172 A. 270
(1934), where the plaintiff-wife had made numerous offers prior to suit
and her affirmative reply to the Chancellor's question at the trial as to her
willingness to return to her husband appears to have been regarded as
corroborative of wife's good faith in making the prior offers; Coleman iv.
Coleman, 51 A. 2d 673 (1947). In this case the wife had left the husband,
taking certain items of furniture and returning from time to get articles
of clothing. During these visits the husband made no effort to persuade
her to remain; and on the last -visit, which was the day on which he
filed the complaint, she declared that she had come home to stay; but he
refused her offer and ejected her from the house. The Court held that
the husband had not clearly shown Intent to desert on the part of the wife
and said: ". . . evidence of conduct . . . after the filing of the bill or
the cross-bill respectively, is admissible only as reflecting on intent-or on
revival of condoned offenses." The evidence was in conflict as to whether
the offer to return was made on the day the suit was filed or a month later.
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do not categorically state that an offer made after suit is
filed need not be accepted. The issue is invariably complicated by such other factors as the bona fides of the belated
offer, its affect on ante-litem offers, the fact that the offer
was neither made nor refused directly but consisted of a
mere affirmative or negative answer to the prodding of
counsel or of the Chancellor seeking to effect a reconciliation. Thus in Simmont v. Simmont,12 6 the Court said:
"And while at the trial he said that, because she
refused his offers to resume cohabitation, he never intended to live with her again, it cannot be said, in the
absence of any evidence sufficient to support the inference that she would accept an offer to resume the
suspended cohabitation, that his mere statement, made
in answer to a question by counsel, was sufficient to
change the status of the parties as it existed at the
institution of the suit .... But that rule [requiring acceptance of a bona fide offer] has no application unless
such an offer has been actually made by one party
and refused by the other. And, in the opinion of a
majority of the Court, a declaration such as that made
by Simmont is a mere hypothetical statement of a future course of action predicated upon facts which may
never exist, and not the refusal of an offer within the
meaning of the rule."
Kirkwood v. Kirkwood 127 presented a similar situation.
Prior to suit the wife had called the husband on the telephone to discuss reconciliation, but he had refused to talk
about it in this way. At the trial, following an adjournment
for two weeks to see if reconciliation could be effected, the
wife, in answer to a question by the Chancellor as to her
willingness to return to the home where the husband's
mother also resided, replied: "I think I would." The husband, in reply to the Chancellor's inquiry as to his willingness to take the wife back, declared that his wife's repeated
departures from the home left him without confidence in
her and that he did not want her back. The Court held the
husband not guilty of desertion, and said:
I Supra,n. 87, 432.
1
"Supra, n. 117.
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"The answer related to the reasons why he would
not desire to resume cohabitation and, so, was not a
refusal to permit her to return. Nor, in the absence of
a proper offer of the wife to return, could the husband
be thus put to an election. The wife must recover
upon a cause of action subsisting at the time of her
suit, although the subsequent conduct and declarations
of the parties may, subject to applicable limitations
imposed upon its admissibility, be received in evidence
in corroboration or as reflecting upon the fault of the
parties with respect to their separation.
"There is, moreover, not much weight to be given
to the answer of the wronged spouse in reply to the
question whether he would renew cohabitation with
the erring spouse upon her equivocal declaration that
she might be willing to return, which she had, a few
minutes before, freshly made in the course of her
testimony in open Court, since time for consideration,
reflection, and decision was necessary to a conclusive
reply.... The rights of the wronged spouse, however,
cannot be made to depend upon the nature of his
answer as to what he would do in imaginary circumstances, which had not assumed any definite form."
In the first appeal in Dearholt v. Dearholt28 , the Court
said:
"To a question of the Chancellor during the hearing
below the husband answered that he was not willing
to live with the wife now, but that avowal does not
constitute the desertion upon which permanent alimony might be decreed."
In Dunnigan v. Dunnigan, where the husband had de129
sert the wife without cause, the Court said:
". .. the husband's offer of reconciliation made
at the final hearing in this case comes too late, and is
also lacking in the elements necessary to show good
faith. Moreover, his testimony on that point is, at
best, an implied offer to provide for them through
his own mother and father in the latter's home, rather
than on the husband's own obligation and responsibility. This belated and insufficient offer aggravates,
'=

tupra, n. 119.

supra, n. 13.
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rather than justifies, his continued failure to discharge
his obligations as husband and father prior to that
time."
In Fischerv. Fischer,the Court said: 12a
"His belated statement at the trial that he was
prepared to offer his wife a separate home means nothing, in view of his previous actions. What he suggests
now, after the case has been brought, after the separation has occurred, and the case is being heard, comes
too late to prevent an adverse decision of the Court."
In McClees v. McClees, 8 ° the wife had originally sued
for an a mensa divorce on the ground of the husband's
cruelty. Denial of this relief was affirmed.11 ° a The difficulty
between the parties appeared to stem from the fact that
the husband kept his dependent mother in the household.
Four months after the affirmance in the first case, the wife
filed a bill for permanent alimony based on the husband's
alleged constructive desertion in refusing her offer of
reconciliation subsequent to the affirmance of the first case.
The husband contended that the wife's offer was improperly conditioned upon a home apart from his mother. Accordingly, the husband declared in his answer that the
wife had in effect made no offer to return to his home,
which at all times was open to her. After the filing of this
answer, the wife placed a few belongings in her hat box
and, accompanied by two witnesses, presented herself for
admittance to the defendant's home with an unconditional
offer to resume cohabitation. This overture the defendant
rejected. In denying the wife relief the Court said that her
attempted reconciliation after filing of the suit was"... so manifestly a self-serving maneuver made
post litem motem that it has no evidential value in
determining the question whether or not the wife's
offer to return before suit brought was a conditional
one, as maintained by the husband. .
In the second appeal in the Dearholt case,' the wife
sued for an a mensa divorce based upon the husband's
Supra, n. 53, 292.
11 Supra, n. 89.
O' 160 Md. 115, 152 A. 901 (1931).
ImSupra, n. 119.
'"

1949]

CONSTRUCTIVE DESERTION

rejection of her offers of reconciliation made both pending
,the first case and subsequent to its termination. The Court
pointed out that the first case had left the parties living
apart without fault for the original separation chargeable
to either so that each was under a duty to seek reconciliation. The evidence showed that the wife had made several attempts to become reconciled by visiting her husband
and writing to him. On one occasion when she went to
his home, he had her arrested and his lawyer threatened
her with appropriate proceedings unless she desisted. Much
of the testimony in the case related to matters that transpired both prior to and pending the first suit. With respect
to this evidence, the Court said, referring to the first case:
"Because of that adjudication the Court is precluded
in this suit from the consideration of anything as a
ground for the relief prayed except the conduct of the
parties after that suit was instituted. . . . Since any
decree in that case must have been based upon acts,
conduct and transactions occurring before the institution of the suit, such matters are not relevant to the
present inquiry. On the other hand, events occurring
during the pendency of that suit and
subsequent to its
u
final determination are relevant. laa
This language necessarily excluded from consideration as
a basis for a decree in the second case conduct and transactions occurring subsequent to the filing of the second case.
Nevertheless, in arriving at the conclusion that the wife
was entitled to relief because she did "all she could reasonably be expected to do to effect a reconciliation; he did all
that he could do to prevent it", the Court referred at length
to the evidence of what transpired after the filing of the
second suit and during a period when the parties undertook
to live together under the same roof pursuant to a suggestion of the Chancellor, who had postponed the case to determine whether a reconciliation could be effected. It
appears, however, that the Court's consideration of these
post litem occurrences was merely by way of corroboration
of the bona fides of the wife's ante litem overtures and the
husband's unjustified resistance to them.
r"Ibid., 408.
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It is apparent from the Maryland decisions that no hard
and fast rule can be laid down as to the possible affect of a
post litem offer of reconciliation in a particular case. The
ultimate decision must depend upon all the preceding circumstances involved and the definiteness and sincerity of
purpose with which the belated offer is made. Suffice it to
say that such overtures cannot be summarily dismissed
but must be carefully weighed and considered, particularly with respect to their bearing upon the offeror's intent
18 2
to desert.
Although there is only supporting dictum in Maryland,'8 3 the rule is well settled elsewhere that an offer of
reconciliation made after the flux of the statutory period
has ripened the desertion into a complete cause for divorce
need not be accepted; and it is ineffective to deprive the
deserted spouse of his or her right to a divorce.'
See Coleman v. Coleman, 8upra, n. 125.
Simmont v. Simmont, supra, n. 87, which was a suit for permanent alimony where the Court said: "Desertion is a continuing offense, and ordinar'

ily, until it has by the flux of the statutory period ripened into a complete

cause for divorce, the duty rests upon each party to the marriage to accept
any offer made in good faith

. .

." (Italics supplied.)

See also Dunnigan v.

Dunnigan, circa, n. 1-9, where the wife sought an absolute divorce for
desertion and the Court declared categorically that "the husband's offer of
reconciliation made at the hearing in this case comes too late." But the
Court added that the offer was not in good faith. It is to be obseryed that
in this case the offer was not only made after the flux of the statutory
period but after the filing of the suit, which thus created a double hurdle
to jump.
I"Note in 18 A. L. R. 630; 19 C. J. 67, Sec. 125; 27 C. J. S. 578, Sec. 38;
17 Amer. Jur. 211, Sec. 114; KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (3rd Ed.), Sec.
396; 2 SCHOULE,, MARR., DIV., SEPAR. AND DOM. REL., Sec. 1632. 1 NELsON,
DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT, Sec. 4.29. The writer is of the opinion that

little support can be found for a different conclusion in the Maryland
statute, Md. Code (1939), Art. 16, Sec. 40, as amended, Acts 1949, Ch. 520.
It may conceivably be argued that since the statute not only requires a
continuous, deliberate and final desertion for at least eighteen months
but also that it "is beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation",
the latter requirement is not fulfilled where an offer of reconciliation has
been made even after the eighteen months has expired. Such an argument
would apply with equal force even though the offer were made after suit,
for the requirement is expressed in the present tense and would be binding
on the Chancellor until the final decision is made. (But Cf. Dunnigan x.
Dunnigan, supra, n. 13.) It Is submitted, however, that such an interpretation would disrupt the orderly administration of justice which requires
that the time of accrual of actions be determinable and that suitors stand
or fall upon the cause of action as it existed at the time of suit.
Cf. Green v. Green, aupra, n. 70, where the technical defense of recrimination was allowed against the plaintiff-husband notwithstanding his act
of adultery was committed after the wife's desertion had continued for
the statutory period.
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C. Offer made while parties are living apart under a
decree for alimony or partial divorce.
There is strong dicta in two Maryland cases to the effect
that a proper offer of reconciliation made by the offending
spouse while the parties are living apart under a decree
for alimony, as distinguished from a partial divorce, must
be accepted." 5 We have already seen'36 that both of these
cases are authority for the proposition that where the
alimony decree is based on the defendant's cruelty, the offer
of reconciliation must pass a higher test than mere "good
faith". In both of these cases the offers were found inadequate and insincere, so that the question now under discussion was not directly involved. It is clear, however,
from the extensive inquiry which the Court made into the
bona fides of the offers in these cases that the generally
accepted distinction between cases involving offers of
reconciliation where the parties are living apart under a
separate maintenance decree and those where there has
been a partial divorce"' will be followed in this State
when the question is directly presented. Indeed, in the
latest case of Zuckerberg v. Zuckerberg,18 which quoted
at length from Wise v. Wise," 9 the Court declared in so
many words that the case turned upon the good faith of
the husband's offer, which was made while a separate
maintenance decree was in force in favor of the wife. This
would hardly have been considered the pivotal point in the
case if the alimony decree constituted an insuperable barrier. In the Wise case, which also involved an offer made
while a separate maintenance decree was in effect, the
Court said:
"It would be difficult, and, on this appeal it is unnecessary, to attempt to formulate a general rule as
to the duties of separated spouses in regard to opportunities for reconciliation after a decree for alimony,
as distinguished from a decree for partial divorce, has
11Wise v. Wise, supra, n. 20; Zuckerberg v. Zuckerberg, supra, n. 20.
Text circa,n. 123a and n. 123b.

See note 61 A. L. R. 1268; 17 Amer. Jur. 209, Sec. 111; Slavinsky v.
Slavinsky, 8upra,n. 20.
"

"

Supra, n. 20.
Sit pra, n. 20.
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been rendered. The decision of every case must be
governed by its own facts."
No Maryland case has considered the effect of an offer
of reconciliation made while the parties are living apart
under a decree a mensa et thoro. The law is well settled
elsewhere, however, that a spouse living apart under an
a mensa decree need not accept an offer of reconciliation
and that a charge of desertion cannot be predicated upon
a refusal of such an overture. 4 ' There are sound reasons
for applying a different rule in cases where an a mensa
decree is involved. As stated in the Arizona case of Williams
v. Williams: 41
"The action for separate maintenance and the action
for divorce a mensa et thoro are not the same. The
former has for its object the compelling of a husband,
who has wilfully deserted or abandoned his wife or
who has committed acts that would give cause for an
action for an absolute divorce, to provide a support
for his wife.'42 . . . It more directly involves property
rights. The judgment does not expressly authorize the
wife to live separate and apart from the husband.
That is probably what happens, but if so not under the
sanction of a court decree, whereas under a decree
for separation from bed and board the refusal of the
wife to cohabit with the husband is so sanctioned and
authorized. When a decree from bed and board is once
entered the statute provides how it may be revoked.
...No such provision is contained in the statute providing for the action for separate maintenance."' 43
See authorities cited supra, n. 137.
"'33 Ariz. 367, 265 P. 87 (1928).
1 This
same view of an alimony decree was taken by the Maryland
Court of Appeals in Strezgowski v. Strezgowski, 175 Md. 53, 59, 199 A.. 809.)
(1938). The question under discussion in the text was not involived, but
the Court said: "As has been seen, the decree from which the appeal is
taken Is not one for divorce; its design is to enforce a recalcitrant husband
to meet his own legal responsibility." See also RIa.vinsky v. Slavinsky.
supra, n. 20, 828, where the Court said: "A libel for divorce is a proceeding
different in Its nature from a petition for separate maintenance. Since a
decree on a petition for separate support does not create a status but
adjudicates concerning that which may be a temporary situation, a Court
of competent jurisdiction has power to determine upon issues properly
raised whether that situation in fact exists at a later date ... "
1I" The statutory provision referred to authorizes the Court to revoke an
a mefsa decree upon application of the wife and a showing of reconciliation.
It is similar to the provision of the Maryland Statute (Md. Code (1939)
Art. 16, Sec. 41, as amended Acts 1949, Ch. 370) which authorizes the
'4
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On principle, however, it would seem that the rejection
of a proper offer of reconciliation after an a mensa decree
would break the continuity of the desertion and prevent
the offeree from obtaining an a vinculo decree after the
passage of the statutory period. And although the offeror
would also be precluded from obtaining a final divorce
based on the offeree's desertion, either party should be
entitled to a final divorce for any of the other statutory
causes,14 4 except, perhaps, for voluntary separation.'
4. Unjustified refusal to maintain a home separate
and apart from parents or other relatives
The law is well settled that the husband, as head of the
family, has the right to determine where the matrimonial
domicile shall be, and it is the duty of the wife to accompany him. 1 5a It is also within the husband's power to determine, within reasonable limits, who shall reside in or even
visit in the home.' 46 However, the husband's right to select
Court to revoke an a mensa decree upon joint application of the parties.
There is no statute in Maryland which provides for the revocation of an
alimony decree. However, the Court has indicated that the husband can
secure the revocation of an alimony decree "by compliance with the solemn
,vows he took when he was married". Strezgowski ,v. Strezgowski, ibid.
This would seem to contemplate not only a provision for maintenance but
also a bona fide offer to resume cohabitation.
" See the second appeal In Williams v. Williams, 37 Ariz. 176, 291 P. at
994 (1930).
'" See Krause v. Krause, 177 Wis. 165, 187 N. W. 1019 (1922), where
the parties were living apart under an a Men8a decree In favor of the
husband when the wife offered to become reconciled. The husband rejected
the offer. The wife thereafter sued for an absolute divorce based on voluntary separation for the statutory period. Relief was denied the wife because
her offer of reconciliation made the separation involuntary as to her. See
also Riland iv. Riland, supra, n. 120.
I'll Hoffhines iv. Hoffhines, 146 Md. 350, 126 A. 112 (1924); Foeller v.
Foeller, 171 Md. 660, 190 A. 221 (1937) ; Fischer v. Fischer, supra, n. 53.
'4 Jacobs fv. Jacobs, 170 Md. 405, 185 A. 109 (1936) ; Fischer .v. Fischer,
ibid. In the Miller case, 178 Md. 12, 19, the Court said: "Within reasonable
limits, the husband, as head of the family, has the right to say who shall
or who shall not visit the home ...,and while the absolute quality of that
right has been much modified since Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. Con. 36, 161,
Eng. Reprint 466, nevertheless the right of the husband to exclude from
his home persons who are offensive or obnoxious to him ought not to be
doubted. It does not follow, however, that the right Is so peremptory and
Imperative that the temporary presence of a visitor who enters the home
with the wife's implied permission, but not at her request or invitation, to
visit another member of the household, will justify the husband in deserting
his wife, even though the visitor is unwelcome to him. He was head of the
family and if he objected to Brown's presence he himself should have told
Brown so; lie had no right to impose upon his wife the unwelcome and
humiliating duty of informing either Brown, or her son Oliver, who invited
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the home and determine who shall be its inmates and visitors is not an arbitrary power and must be exercised in a
reasonable manner and with due regard for the wife's
health, comfort and peace of mind.'4 7 The husband's prerogative finds its basis in the duty which rests upon him
to provide a home for his wife; and this duty extends not
only to the furnishing of material comforts in accordance
with his means, but also requires that the home be one
where the wife is free from unwarranted interference from
members of the household.'
Where the husband, being
financially able to do so, fails to provide such a home for
his wife, she is justified in leaving and charging him with
constructive desertion. 149 Hoff hines v. Hoffhines5 ° was the
first decision in this State to grant affirmative relief by
applying this principle to a case where the husband insisted
upon maintaining the matrimonial domicile at the home
of his parents, although in Young v. Young' a wife was
permitted to defend a charge of desertion on the ground
of the husband's failure to provide a home apart from the
home of his parents which was uncongenial and caused
her much unhappiness. The general rule was recognized
in the early case of Buckner v. Buckner"2 , where the husband's daughters by a former marriage resided in the household; but the rule was not applied because the Court found
that the petty quarrels between the wife and the daughters
were not serious enough to entitle her to demand a separation of them from their father as a condition of her resumpBrown to the home, that he must not come there because her husband
thought there was some impropriety in the relationship between her and
Brown .... and while the wife's rights in the regulation of the household
were subordinate to those of the husband, she was neither a menial nor
a servant, and be had no right to require her to Insult an inoffensive guest
by telling him that he must not enter the home."
In the Jacobs case the Court declared that the husband had the right
to insist that adult sons of the parties live apart from them, and the wife
had no right to demand that they be permitted to remain in the home
as a condition of her continuing to live with her husband.
14TCases cited supra, n. 145a, n. 146: and see Crouch v. Crouch, supra,
n. 72.
I' Ibid.
",Hoffhines v. Hoffhines, supra, n. 145a; McClees v. McClees, supra, n.
89; Fischer v. Fischer, supra, n. 53.
'oIbid.
' 136 Md. 84, 110 A. 207 (1920).
1
118 Md. 101, 84 A. 156 (1912).
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tion of cohabitation. Most of the cases on the subject under
discussion involved parties living with the husband's parents, either in homes owned by the parents or the husband.
A few of the cases involved children by a former marriage
of one of the parties, adult sons of the parties or a brother.
Basically, the same principle is applied in all of these cases
without any distinction being made because of the class
of relative involved or the actual ownership of the home.
The determining factors are, primarily, whether the wife's
proper sphere of control in the home has been unreasonably and unwarrantedly invaded by the inmates, and, secondarily, whether the husband is financially able to provide
an independent home for the wife.' 53
In this class of cases, involving the wife's demand for
an independent home, the Court refuses to be bound by
or even formulate an inflexible rule of general application.
Here again each case must be determined on its own
peculiar facts and circumstances.!" There are, however,
certain considerations to which the Court attaches varying
Buckner v. Buckner, ibid., involved two unmarried daughters of the
husband by a prior marriage; Young ,v. Young, Rtepra, n. 151, where the
parties resided in the home of the husband's parents; Hoffhines v. Hoffhines, supra, n. 145a, where the parties resided in the home of the bus'band's parents; Nickel 1v.Nickel, 150 Md. 702, unreported, where it appeared
that the parties lived in separate parts of the same house with husband's
parents, but it was not clear who owned the property; Crouch v. Crouch,
supra, n. 72, where the husband's Insane brother resided in the home
owned by the husband; Ewing v. Ewing, 154 Md. 84, 140 A. 37 (1928),
where the parties resided in the home of the husband's parents, but the
latter were dependent upon him for support; Schwartz v. Schwartz, supra,
n. 33, where the household was an ill-assorted mixture of children of both
parties by prior marriages; McClees v. McClees, suprt, n. 89, where husband's dependent mother resided in the home owned by husband; Ayares
v. Ayares, 163 Md. 388, 163 A. 707 (1933), where husband's self-supporting
mother resided in the home owned by husband; Kirkwood v. Kirkwood.
165 Md. 547, where the parties resided In home of the husband's parents:
Jacobs v. Jacobs, supra, n. 146, where adult sons of the parties resided in
home owned by husband-father: Foeller v. Foeller, supra, n. 145a, where
mother resided in home owned by husband: Lorea v. Lorea, 181 Md. 666.
unreported, except in 30 A. 2d 73 (1943). where wife insisted that parties
reside with her daughter by a former marriage and an aunt of the wife:
Fischer v. Fischer, supra, n. 145a, where parties resided in home of husband's mother: Miller v. Miller, 62 A. 2d 293 (Md. 1948), where the parties
resided in the home of the husband's parents.
I" Buckner v. Buckner, ibid.; Hoffhines v. Hoffhines, ibid.; Foeller .v.
Foeller, ibid.; Fischer v. Fischer, ibid., 287, where following a statement
of the husband's duty to furnish the wife a home free from umwarranted
interference from members of the household, the Court said: "These statements are not absolute, and no rule of general application can be formulated, each case being based largely on its own circumstances."
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weight in support of what it deems a proper conclusion
in a particular case. Thus in the Hoffhines case, the Court
declared:
"One of the strong incentives for marriage is the
prospect and expectation by the newly married parties
of establishing an independent home in which the husband and wife, each in their proper sphere, are supreme. This instinctive desire of home building should
be encouraged and fostered, as upon the foundation
of independent and happy homes the stability and prosperity of a nation largely depends.""-'
In this case the parties appeared to be a young married
couple living in the home of the husband's parents. Conditions there were extremely unpleasant. The wife was
required to do housework, washing and ironing for the
entire household. She had no freedom of action and was
at the beck and call of the husband's parents. The husband
agreed that it would be better to live away from the
parents, and he rented an apartment where the parties
resided for four months in comparative harmony. He refused to renew the lease and insisted that his wife return
with him to the home of his parents. The Court held that
her refusal was justified; and that since the husband was
financially able to provide an independent home, he was
guilty of constructive desertion. In addition to the incentive of home-building, the Court laid stress on the fact
that the parties had attempted without success to live with
the husband's parents. 5
Another consideration upon which the Court will rely
in support of its conclusion is the fact that the wife had
knowledge prior to the marriage of the conditions under
which she would have to live. This was the case in Buckner
v. Buckner, referred to above, where in denying the wife
15 This consideration would not seem to carry much weight in a case
involving parties of middle age or beyond with'prior marital experience
and adult children. In the Hoffhines case the age of the parties was not
g ven, but it appeared that they were a young couple without prior marital
experience.
"I "If these young married people had not already made the experiment
of hying with the husband's parents and found it unsatisfactory and..uncongenial . . . or if, as a matter of fact, it was the only place which the
husband could have provided as a home for himself and wife, this case
would presebt'a different aspect." Supra, n. 145a, 360.
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relief for the husband's failure to establish a home apart
from his daughters by a prior marriage, the Court leaned
heavily on the fact that the wife knew in advance of the
marriage that she would have to live with these daughters,
who were sensitive to her taking the place of their mother
who had died less than a year before the second marriage.
However, in Fischer v. Fischer,"' the Court glossed over
this consideration in holding the wife entitled to an independent home notwithstanding her prior knowledge of the
conditions under which she would have to live, and said:
".... the wife is in general entitled to a separate home, or
at least one in which she is mistress and has the control.
If circumstances make it necessary for her to live in the
home of her husband [sic, should read 'husband's parents'],
and she is aware of this when she is married, she cannot
complain of it, if her husband is unable to provide for her
elsewhere, but if he can, he must do so. The right to a
separate home under ordinary circumstances is the right
upon which a wife is entitled to insist." With respect to
the restraints placed upon the wife and her subordinate
position in the household, the Fischer case was analogous
to the Hoffhines case.1 5S At the time of the marriage
Fischer was 40 years old and his wife was 25. He had been
married before. She had not. He took her to reside with
his widowed mother. The wife testified that she knew
when she was married that she would have to live with
her mother-in-law. The latter continued to be mistress of
the household, and the wife was to all intents and purposes
relegated to the position of a boarder. In addition the
mother-in-law frequently interfered with the wife's disciplining of the infant child of the parties. The husband
disregarded his wife's complaints concerning her treatment
Supra, n. 145a.
See also Nickel v. Nickel, sm pra, n. 153 for similar restraints placed
upon the wife. In that case the Court held the wife was not guilty of
desertion because she was justified in leaving the home where she lived
under the same roof with husband's family, it appearing that she had
been treated as an outcast by his family, who used her kitchen for their
convenience but denied her access to their part of house, that the husband
did not resent this, and spent much of his time with his family, lealving her
alone and neglected. But the wife was denied affirmative relief because
it did not appear that she had demanded a separate home or that her
husband could hame afforded to furnish her one.
"
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in the household; and although he was financially able to
establish an independent home for her, he refused to do so.
The Court reviewed all the earlier decisions on the subject
and concluded that the husband was guilty of constructive
desertion. The Court's unfavorable impression of the husband's attitude toward his wife seems to have gone far in
tipping the scales against him. The Court said: "It seems
to be his desire to remain where he has been all his life,
in the home run by his mother, and he treats the wife's
complaints about it and her distaste for it as if they were
unjustified complaints of a child, who has no rights at all."
The Court also quoted the incentive of home-building from
the Hoffhines case. In Miller v. Miller," which is the most
recent case on the subject, the Court, in rejecting the wife's
charge of constructive desertion, distinguished the Fischer
case on the two-fold ground that Mrs. Miller was admittedly
well treated in the home of her husband's parents and that
her husband was financially unable to provide a separate
home for her.6 0
The Court has also attached importance in this class
of cases to the fact that the husband was under an obligation to support the relative whose presence in the home
was objectionable to the wife. This consideration is particularly relevant on the question of the husband's ability
to maintain a separate home for his wife. In Ewing v.
Ewing,'6 1 the parties lived in the home of the husband's
parents who were solely dependent upon him for their
support. The wife was denied relief primarily because it
was shown that her difficulties with her husband's parents
were trivial and that her husband was not financially able
to provide a separate home for her. The case was distinguished from the Hoffhines case on the ground that Mrs.
Ewing was entirely free from the restraints under which
Mrs. Hoffhines was required to live. However, the Court
Supra, n. 117.
11This case arose during the post-war housing shortage, and the Court
took judicial notice of the fact that it was then very difficult to rent any
suitable habitation at a reasonable price. The Court said: "A husband is
not required to maintain a home elsewhere if it is not practical for him
to do so. The difficulties must be grave if the wife, without sufficient
justification, leaves a home properly maintained by him with his parents."
"1

1 Spra,n. 153.
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also referred to the criminal statutes on non-support and
declared that these statutes compel the husband to contribute to the support of his parents as well as to the support of his wife. A fuller discussion of this point is found
in McClees v. McClees,6 2 where the aged and dependent
mother of the husband resided in the household. In denying the wife relief, the Court held that the case was governed by Ewing v. Ewing and not Hoff hines v. Hoffhines.
Mrs. McClees was found to be in complete charge of the
household, with a corps of servants under her control and
direction and with ample funds to be expended as she
might decide. The Court could find no interference by
the husband's mother. The Court, after commenting on
the foregoing, added:
"While it is true that a husband owed the duty to
his wife of doing those things conducive to her happi-ness and comfort, yet this does not mean that he should
disregard the duty of caring for and protecting others
of his immediate family who are dependent upon him.
Common sense does not suggest, and the law does not
require it .... Persons having natural or legal duties
and obligations before marriage should not be required
or disregard them upon assuming
to entirely relinquish
1 63
the marital status.'
However, in Ayares v. Ayares, 64 a case involving a different set of facts, the Court declared: "His wife should
have been his first thought and consideration. If need be,
he should have forsaken all others for her." This language
was clearly appropriate to the situation which the Court
found in that case. The parties had lived congenially for a
number of years until the husband brought his mother,
who was self-supporting, to live in the home. 0 5 It was
shown that the mother-in-law was of a combative disposi"ISupra,n. 145a.
"' There was no doubt that McClees was financially able to provide for
his mother elsewhere; and the decision demonstrates that Just as the
husband cannot arbitrarily compel his wife to live with his relatives, she
cannot arbitrarily compel him to provide a separate home for her even
though he is financially able to do so.
I Supra, n. 153.
15 The mother was shown to have been self-supporting prior to a recent
illness. The Court said that qven if she was not now self-supporting, the
husband and his brother were financially able to support her in an independent establishment.
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tion and told the wife that she was ready for either peace
or war. The entire aspect of the case was not one of a son
undertaking to care for an aged and dependent mother,
but rather one of a strong-willed mother-in-law who had
always had her own home, coming on a protracted visit
and wearing out her welcome by unwarranted interference
in the management of the household. In the later case of
Foellerv. Foeller,6 6 the Court again recognized by implication the obligation of a married man to his aged and dependent mother and denied the wife relief because "the testimony convinces us that the husband's mother has not been
uncongenial to appellant and moreover that it is a physical
impossibility for appellee to provide a separate home for
the mother."
CONCLUSION

Constructive desertion is a salutary and useful fiction
in the law of divorce. When properly confined and applied
it synthesizes the realities of an otherwise non-conforming
situation with the requirements of technical terminology
and definition. When indiscriminately applied, however,
it is capable of much mischief. As Judge Markell has said
-it "is not an equivalent of any of the catch-alls which
in some States help to attract a nationwide market for a
local industry." The facility with which cruelty may be
twisted and manipulated into constructive desertion," 7
with the consequent granting in some cases of an absolute
divorce for a' cause which the Legislature has declared to
be ground for a partial divorce only, lends a modicum of
justification to Bentham's acidulous definition of a legal
fiction as "a wilful falsehood, having for its object the
stealing of legislative power"."6 8 If our Courts intend (as
they have often declared.6 9 ) to continue to resist the pressure of modern society for an easy escape from the bonds
of matrimony, a more conscious effort must be made to keep
the fiction of constructive desertion within the legitimate
boundaries of its application.
"mSupra,n. 145a.
107See Walker, Our Present Divorce Muddle (1949), 35 A.. B. A. J. 457, 460.
18 Supra, n. 1.
Supra, n. 1.

